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This dissertation primarily examines two separate topics: evidencing the presence of bound-
edly rational behavior on currency designs and re-examination of extant status theory as
applied to high-status actors in a socialist setting. The first two chapters address exchange
rate illusion post currency redenomination policies and potential effects on the exchange
rate movement. I show that redenomination policy that leads to significant changes in the
currency quotation can lead to significant exchange rate depreciation. The last chapter is a
joint work with my supervisor (Professor Rajiv Kozhikode) and Professor Rekha Krishnan.
We re-examine extant status theory’s central assumption that high-status actors are benefi-
ciaries of biased evaluations of their audience. We find evidence in support of detrimental
judgement for high-status firms in socialist settings.
The first chapter, entitled Currency Redenomination and the Nominal Superiority Shock
on Exchange Rates: A Time Series Analysis, examines movements in exchange rates after
redenomination. I find evidence of exchange rate depreciation of the currency with nominal
superiority shock during the redenomination policy but not for currencies without the
shock. The uniqueness in the exchange rate depreciation of the currency affected by the
nominal shock is supported by an event study of neighboring currencies with no concurrent
redenomination policy.
The second chapter, entitled Evidencing Forex Illusion under Currency Redenomination:
Experimental Approach, is a follow up study on the empirical time series results obtained
in the first chapter. This chapter examines the presence of a nominal illusion bias asso-
ciated with nominal exchange rate and currency conversion decisions in an incentivized
experiment. The results of the experiment support the presence of Forex Illusion further
lending credence to the shift in currency demand and depreciation post redenomination.
The third chapter, entitled Guilty Until Proven Otherwise: High Status and the Burden
of Proof under Socialism, we re-examine extant status theory’s central assumption that
high-status actors are beneficiaries of biased evaluations of their audience. We contend
that, in socialist settings, high-status firms invoke a negative stereotype in the eyes of
their evaluators. We find support for our theory in our analysis of the verdicts on lawsuits
between commercial banks in India and their defaulting borrowers in the High Court of
Kerala.
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Keywords: Currency redenomination, Nominal illusion, Exchange rate, Forecasting, Causal-
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Chapter 1
Currency Redenomination and the
Nominal Superiority Shock on
Exchange Rates: A Time Series
Analysis
A time series forecasting analysis is used to examine movements in exchange rates after
currency redenomination. I find evidence of significant exchange rate depreciation of the
currency with nominal superiority shock during the redenomination policy but not for
currencies without the shock. The uniqueness in the depreciation of the currency affected
by the shock is supported by an event study of neighboring currencies with no concurrent
redenomination policy. Further evidence of the shock on the exchange rate is supported by
a causality test which shows macroeconomic variables did not cause the depreciation.
1.1 Introduction
Currency redenomination happens when a country changes the nominal value of its cur-
rency. Redenomination, as it is commonly referred to, is mostly undertaken by adding or
removing zeros from the existing currency with the latter being the most common. There
are both economic and political reasons motivating a country to redenominate its currency
(Mosley (2005)). A key economic factor is inflation (Euphrasia & Sri (2012)). Countries
experiencing episodes of hyperinflation find it difficult to use their currencies due to large
amounts of paper monies needed for smaller transactions. Furthermore, there is an in-
duced accounting and computing difficulty with these currencies as smaller transactions
are computed in higher denominations (see The-Herald-Sun (2008)). Under such difficult
circumstances, affected countries often resort to redenomination to enhance convenience in
their currency usage.
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A closely related currency change policy to redenomination is the adoption of a new
currency in an identified optimal currency region (i.e. OCR)1 with the recent example been
the introduction of the Euro. Both policies share similar implementation guideline where
the new currency replaces the new currency. However, redenomination is starkly different
from other currency adoption polices in terms of degree of usage, political motives and
economic considerations. First, unlike OCR where a specified currency is chosen for certain
group of countries in an identified economic zone with the new currency replacing all
existing currencies of the group members, redenomination is mostly implemented by a
single country and replaces a single currency. Second, whereas solidarity2 among member
countries in a region politically motivates the creation of a common currency, political
events like regime changes rather leads to redenomination. Last, whiles ease in trade among
members in OCR economically drives the adoption of a new currency, redenomination is
primarily influenced by inflation.
Apart from the associated convenience in currency usage after the policy’s implementa-
tion, other positive effects have been documented on the economy. For instance, inflation,
the key economic factor for the adoption of redenomination policy, is significantly reduced
after the policy. Using a panel setup with fixed effect, Erwin & Putu (2017) find a significant
decrease in the estimated inflation of the redenominated countries. Another study by Libor
& Michal (2015) of Turkey found a reduction in inflation after the currency redenomination.
Given the reduction in inflation, theory predicts an appreciation in the redenominated
currencies. A possible mechanism to explain this expected currency appreciation is the
initial increase in real interest from the reduced inflation (Fisher (1896))3. With an increased
real interest rate comes an increase in foreign investment with related increase in demand
for domestic currency leading to a potential currency appreciation.
Based on insights from the nominal illusion literature4, however, the nominal effect of
the redenomination policy on consumer behavior might undo the positive impact of the
predicted exchange rate appreciation. The significance of this nominal effect is apparent
in instances where the nominal exchange rate of these newly redenominated currencies
become nominally expensive relative to a major international currency (i.e. nominal superi-
ority gain). A case in point is the Ghanaian redenomination policy in July of 2007 that led to
the removal of four zeros from the currency, Ghana Cedi. This removal of four zeros meant
1See Mundell (1973) on the essence of common currency for a common economic zone.
2Optimistic comments by Wim Duisenberg (i.e. Governor of European Central Bank) and Joschka Fischer
(German Foreign Minister) were expressed on the effect of the Euro towards fostering an European solidarity.
This optimism of Euro effect on solidarity were later found to be non-existent in a study by Buscha et al. (2017)
3Fishers equation: real interest rate = nominal interest rate - expected inflation.
4See Shafir et al. (1997), Tversky & Kahneman (1988) , Fehr & Tyran (2001) and Petersen & Winn (2014)
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a change in the nominal exchange rate of the Ghana Cedi relative to the USD5: from 9,298
old Ghana Cedi per USD to 0.9298 new Ghana Cedi per USD. With this change, the Ghana
Cedi, a relatively poor performing currency from a developing economy, gained nominal
superiority against the major trading and reserve currency (i.e. USD). That is, Ghana Cedi
appeared expensive relative to the USD since less than a unit of the Ghana Cedi could buy
1 USD as a result of the redenomination policy. The exchange rate of the new nominal
superior Ghana Cedi relative to the USD is displayed on figure-1.1.
Following the nominal superiority gained by the Ghana Cedi, nominal illusion theory
predicts a strong tendency of changes in currency demand in this developing economy
where the USD is widely accepted as a safer currency. The notion of USD being a safer
currency in developing economies emanates from citizens losing the value of their domestic
currency to factors like inflation and exchange rate depreciation6. Consequently, they
hold as much USD as they can. Additionally, USD is constantly purchased and stored in
developing economies because of import-dependence7 which requires substantial amount
of USD. Thus, given the importance of USD and potential nominal illusion effect, the
nominal superiority gains as seen in Ghana might affect consumers’ currency demand.
With USD now appearing cheaper, nominal illusion findings predict an increase in demand
for the USD relative to the Ghana Cedi and a subsequent depreciation.
Unlike Ghana, other countries like Turkey, Zambia, Mozambique with past redenomi-
nation policies did not experience any change in their currencies’ nominal superiority with
the USD even though changes occurred in the nominal exchange rate quotations. Turkey, for
instance, despite removing six zeros from their currency, did not gain nominal superiority
in their new currency since the USD still appeared expensive in nominal terms (i.e. from
1,343,500 old Turkish Lira per USD to 1.3435 new Turkish Lira per USD). Table-1.1 pro-
vides a detailed description of the changes in the exchange rate quotations per USD after
each of the redenomination policies as well as the nominal superiority shock breakdown.
Inference drawn from the few existing studies on the nominal illusion’s impact on cur-
rencies and consumer behavior largely favors the nominal illusion hypothesis. For instance,
Dzokoto et al. (2010) find evidence of money illusion in wake of the redenomination policy
in Ghana. Their study found that consumers trivialize the nominally adjusted prices hence
affecting their spending pattern. Additionally, by extending the nominal illusion to foreign
currency and product evaluation, studies by Raghubir & Srivastava (2002) and Wertenbroch
et al. (2007) find evidence to support the presence of nominal illusion on product valuation
5United States Dollar.
6Inflation as high as 32.93% in the year 2001 and average of 17.7% between 2001 and 2007 (IMF (2020).).
Furthermore, the Ghana Cedi has constantly depreciated against the USD before the policy Dzawu (2019).
7Ghana has a constant negative trade balance before the implementation of the redenomination policy. OEC
(2020)
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in an experimental setting. Participants in these experiments gave their willingness to pay
for a good based on the nominal value of the currency. Furthermore, in a related study, I
find direct evidence to support the presence of exchange rate illusion in an incentivized
multi-currency conversion decision experimental setting: see Abdul-Salam (Unpublished).
More specifically, in an experiment where participants were tasked to optimally convert
their endowed currency to alternative currencies, I find currencies with higher nominal
exchange rate attracted higher demand.
Consistent with these opposing predictions from inflation reduction and the nominal
illusion effect, the actual effect of currency redenomination on exchange rates remains
mostly unsettled. The few studies on the direct effect of the redenomination on exchange
rates do not find any evidence of redenomination affecting exchange rates. For instance,
using a simple t-test, Euphrasia & Sri (2012) do not find any significant effect of redenomi-
nation on exchange rates. The study by Erwin & Putu (2017) also fails to find any significant
change in the exchange rates post the redenomination policy. Further research on this
topic has become pertinent given its unsettled effect on the exchange rate and widespread
implementation in the recent past by various developing countries8.
In view of this, I extend the study of redenomination’s impact on exchange rates using
an efficient time series forecasting analysis with insights from nominal illusion findings.
First, on the time series aspect, I fit a composite conditional mean and variance model on
the exchange rates in forecasting the prospective exchange rates paths (i.e. counterfactuals).
These forecasted exchange rates paths are both in terms of levels and volatilities. I then
compare the forecasted values of the exchange rates to the realized exchange rates figures
to examine their deviation. Second, an event study is conducted to examine if changes
observed in a currency is unique to the redenomination policy. Last, a causality analysis is
used to check if the observed changes in the exchange rates can be attributed to the other
macroeconomic factors instead of the redenomination.
The approach I use in this paper offers some unique opportunities in cleanly identifying
the true impact of the policy. First, using a relatively high frequency daily data coupled
with efficient time series forecasting models, I get reliable forecast figures against which
the realized exchange rate values can be compared. Second, the forecasting approach helps
circumvents some strong assumptions needed for event study analysis9. Last, key intuition
from the nominal illusion literature provides insights on the directions and mechanisms of
the expected changes in the currencies affected by the nominal superiority shock.
The findings of this paper can be summarized into four main results. First, consistent
with the nominal illusion prediction, I find a sharp and persistent depreciation in the
8From 2000 to date, over 15 countries have redenominated their currencies.
9An example been the parallel trend assumption for the difference-in-difference approach to event study
which require all the currencies to aligned in their movement prior to the redenomination.
4
exchange rate of the redenominated currency with a nominal superiority gain (i.e. Ghana
Cedi) with an associated increased level of volatility. Second, contrary to the Ghana Cedi,
redenominated currencies without nominal superiority shock do not show any significant
depreciation or change in volatility. Third, in the event study analysis, I find that countries
surrounding Ghana (i.e. all the West African countries) with no concurrent redenomination
policy did not experience depreciation in their currencies thereby proving the uniqueness
in the depreciation of the newly redenominated Ghana Cedi. Finally, consistent with the
Central Bank of Ghana’s stance10 of no expected change in the value of the new currency
and by extension no other major concurrent monetary policy changes, the results of the
causality test fail to find any significant causation effect of key macroeconomic variables on
the Ghana Cedi’s depreciation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 1.2 and 1.3 discuss respectively
the methodology and data used in the study. Section 1.4 presents the results of the currency
changes and the causality effect of the macroeconomic variables on the exchange rate.
Section 1.5 analyzes the robustness of the models used in the analysis. Section 1.6 concludes
by examining the economic implication of the results and provides policy recommendation.
Redenomination Information
Country Redenomination Transition Period Number of Old Rate Per USD New Rate Per USD
Year (Months (m)) Zeros Deleted (Rate Quotation) (Rate Quotation)
A. Currency with Nominal Superiority Gain
Ghana 2-Jul-2007 2-Jul to 31-Dec 2007 4 9,298-GHC 0.9298-GHS
(6m) (Expensive USD) (Cheaper USD)
B. Currencies without Nominal Superiority Gain
Turkey 1-Jan-2005 1-Jan to 31-Dec-2005 6 1,343,500-TRL 1.3435-TRY
(12m) (Expensive USD) (Expensive USD)
Zambia 1-Jan-2013 1-Jan to 30-Jun-2013 3 5,195-ZMK 5.195-ZMW
(6m) (Expensive USD) (Expensive USD)
Mozambique 1-July-2006 1-Jul to 31-Dec-2006 3 25,425-MZM 25.425-MZN
(6m) (Expensive USD) (Expensive USD)
Table 1.1: Description of Past Redenominated Currencies
This table gives a detailed description of the past redenominated currencies used in this study.
Ghana Cedi gained nominal superiority against the USD due to the redenomination whiles the
other three currencies did not.
10The common theme for the redenomination carried out by the Central Bank in conjunction with the
National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) was: “there’s no change in value; the value is the same ”.
5
Graph of Currency with Nominal Superiority Shock



















Ghana Cedi relative to USD: Before and After Redenomination
  Redenomination
1 US Dollar (USD) to Ghana Cedi (GHS)
Figure 1.1: Movement of Cedi relative to USD before and after redenomination
1.2 Methodology
In this section, the time series models used in forecasting the exchange rates as well as the
computational method used in defining the significant changes are tackled.
1.2.1 Model Selection and Forecasting
I use the composite conditional mean and variance model to generate the forecast levels
of the various exchange rate series. Preference is given to this model primarily due to the
autocorrelation and serial dependence nature of financial series like the exchange rates.
Also, simple exchange rate models like the random walk and univariate models are found
to be similar in terms of their short horizon prediction accuracy when compared to more
sophisticated fundamental-based models (Meese & Rogoff (1983); Obstfeld & Rogoff (2000),
and Rogoff 2001; Mark (1995)). Furthermore, issues of seigniorage under less stable political
environment which leads to increased inflation and subsequent changes in the exchange
rate path (see Cukierman et al. (1989)) did not affect choice of model since the political
stability index remained stable both prior and post the policy.11
Prior to selecting the final conditional mean and variance forecasting model, I follow
standard procedures prescribed in the time series literature (see Box et al. (1970) and Enders
(2008)). First, I examine the stationarity of the original exchange rate series. This is done
11A structural change model to account for changes in political regimes will be ideal in the event of any
change in ruling government. Data from Ghana shows that the same ruling government was in power between
the period of the analysis (i.e. from January, 2001 to December, 2008)
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with an initial ACF and PACF plots with further confirmation test using the Augmentated
Dickey-Fuller test (ADF; Dickey & Fuller (1979)) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
test (KPSS; Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)). Non-stationary exchange rate series are either
differenced or detrended. Generally, the exchange rate series examined in this paper are
non-stationary and integrated of order one (i.e. I(1)) with few exhibiting presence of trend
with endogenously determined breakpoints.
After accounting for stationary, an ACF and PACF functions of the new stationary series
is plotted in order to determine the suitable conditional ARMA12 model. Additionally, the
prospective lag orders from the plots are recorded. A final determination on the suitable
model is made after comparing the values from the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC;
Schwarz et al. (1978)). Equation-1.1 gives the mathematical representation of the conditional
mean model.







ρjεt−j + εt (1.1)
where c represents the constant term, y is the exchange rate, ε denotes the error term and both φ
and ρ the parameters.
Last, in order to improve the accuracy of the inference, I examine the presence of
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals of the selected models. Generally, I
do not find autocorrelation even though most of the residuals are heteroskedastic. I correct
for the heteroskedasticity in the residual terms by selecting13 among four conditional
variance models: ARCH14 by Engle (1982), GARCH15 by Bollerslev (1986), EGARCH16 by
Nelson (1991) or GJR17 by Glosten et al. (1993). Equation-1.2, equation-1.3 and equation-1.4
give the respective mathematical representation of the conditional variance models.
• Variance Component
given εt = σtvt
where σ represents standard deviation and v is a white noise process.
12ARMA stands for Autoregressive Moving Average.
13Conditional variance model is selected using the their AIC/BIC values.
14ARCH stands for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and suitable for general volatility clustering.
15GARCH stands for generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity is an advanced of the ARCH.
16EGARCH stands for exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic and suitable for
asymmetry clustering or the leverage effect.
17GJR name after the authors (Glosten-Jagannathan-Runkle) also corrects for asymmetry clustering.
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• Respective Conditional Variances:
– GARCH(R,S)
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where α, γ , and ζ denotes the parameters on the respective variables.
The combination of the conditional mean and the conditional variance models yields
the composite conditional mean and variance model used in forecasting the level of the
exchange rate series. Also, the conditional variance model helps forecast the volatility in
the exchange rate series. The forecasting procedure is implemented using two separate
approaches: Monte Carlo (MC) simulation and the standard Minimum Mean Square Error
(MMSE). Overall, the forecasting exercise helps predict with some degree of accuracy the
path the exchange rate series should have taken in the absence of the redenomination
policy.
1.2.2 Selecting Competing Models
The initial analysis of some exchange rate series shows that more than one suitable model
qualifies for the forecasting exercise due to the closeness of their AIC/BIC values. Addition-
ally, some of the exchange rate series qualify for both detrending and differencing under
the stationary test. I consider exchange rate series with either of these features as series
with competing models hence the need for further evaluation.
Consistent with standard practice, I run these competing models separately. First,
models with close AIC/BIC values are subjected to a performance test. This is done by
conducting in-sample fitness/prediction analysis test. I further examine them using the
DM test (Diebold & Mariano (1995)). This test is suitable because it relaxes the normality
and uncorrelatedness of the error terms assumptions under the F-test as well as allows
for non-quadratic objective function (see Enders (2008)). A final model is then selected
from these competing models based on their accuracy in prediction and the results from
the DM test. Second, exchange rate series with evidence of trend are analyzed using two
separate models (i.e. both detrended and differenced) and the results on each of the model
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is separately reported. Refer to the third column of table-1.3, table-A.1 and A.2 for details
of the final models selected for of the each exchange rate series.
1.2.3 Computing Changes in the Exchange Rate
I use a simple deviation from the forecasted path approach to compute whether a currency
appreciated or depreciated after the policy. This approach as shown by equation-1.5 is com-
puted using the percentage difference between the actual realized values of the exchange
rate after the redenomination and the forecasted values from the composite conditional







where xt represents the actual realized values and yt represents the forecasted rates.
Result with positive percentage difference is an indication that the realized values of
the exchange rate are higher than what is expected hence a depreciation whiles a negative
percentage difference indicates an appreciation. This equation is however used on only the
differenced conditional mean and variance models. For the detrended conditional mean
and variance models, I report the graphical deviation from trend between the forecasted
values and the actual realized values.
Before making a final decision on whether a currency changed path, I visually examine
the movement of the exchange rate to see if there is persistence in the deviation from
the forecasted path. I do this additional check to prevent any extreme one-time spike
from biasing the results. Persistence of movement in a particular direction strengthens the
argument of deviation from its path and serves as an accurate depiction of a currency’s
appreciation or depreciation. Additionally, I statistically determine whether the perceived
change is significant by constructing a confidence bound at 5% significance level for the
forecasted path. Any persistent deviation that falls outside the confidence bound is deemed
significant.
1.3 Data
Daily exchange rate figures from Thomson-Reuters-Eikon (2017) are used to examine
the performance of all the currencies relative to the USD. The three time frames under
review are pre-redenomination (i.e. before the policies implementation), transition (i.e.
when both the old and newly redenominated currencies are accepted as legal tenders) and
post-transition (i.e. when only the new currency is accepted as the legal tender).
For the purposes of the Ghana Cedi study and its uniqueness analysis (i.e. event study),
the timing of the Ghana Cedi and other Neighboring West-African currencies remains the
same. Furthermore, to study whether the effects of redenomination are influenced by a
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nominal superiority shock, I compare the redenomination of Ghana to three redenomination
exercises without nominal superiority, namely Turkey, Mozambique and Zambia. These
three countries and their currencies are selected because of their similar features as Ghana
(i.e. non-fixed exchange rate, timing proximity, and regional proximity). First, based on
timing, both Turkey and Mozambique adopted their redenomination at about the same time
as Ghana (i.e. Turkey had their policy in 2005 and Mozambique in 2006). Second, for the
regional comparison basis, I use Zambia in addition to the already selected Mozambique
since they are both situated in the Sub-Saharan region as Ghana. Table-1.2 provides a
detailed description of the time frames and currencies under study.
Generally, data from the pre-redenomination period is used to generate both the forecast
model and the forecast values for the transition period. Also, the post-transition redenom-
ination forecast model and values are generated using both the pre-redenomination and
the transition period data. Additionally, I use pre-redenomination data in forecasting
the post-transition values in the presence of any significant changes in path during the
transition period as these changes make the transition data less suitable for modeling
the post-transition dynamics. This new estimate is called "combine" and can be seen on
table-1.3 after the two main time periods (i.e. Transition and Post).
To further elaborate on table-1.2, Ghana for instance has an overall timeline ranging
from January 2001 to September 2008. Of this date range, January 1st, 2001 to July 1st,
2007 marks the pre-redenomination period. For the transition period where both the new
redenominated currency and old currency are used simultaneously as legal tenders, I use
data from July 2nd to December 31st, 2007 which corresponds to the transition period in
Ghana. The final time frame which falls between January 1st and September 14th,18 2008 or
May 30th, 2008 serve as the post-transition era. For forecast horizon, I choose 6 months (i.e.
July-07:December-07) for the transition period and 5 months (January-08:May-08) for both
the transition and post-transition period when there is a change in path during the transi-
tion analysis. In the absence of any significant change during the transition period, I use
the 8.5 months (Jan-08:September-08) post-transition period for analysis of post-transition
movements. In percentage terms, an average of 10% of the entire dataset is used in the
forecast analysis for both the transition and post-transition period analysis.
18I truncate the post-transition forecast period at 14th September 2008 to avoid the uncertainty in the
financial sector caused by the 2008 global financial crisis.
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Exchange Rate Description and Timelines
Currency Pre-Redenomination Transition Post-Transition
(Countries) (Forecast Horizon) ( Forecast Horizon)
A. Currencies with Nominal Superiority Gain
1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
Cedi
(Ghana) 1-Jan-08 to 30-May-08
B. Neighboring West-African Currencies Used for Event Study
Naira 1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
(Nigeria)
CEFA-XOF 1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-
Bissau, Togo Ivory-Coast, Mali,
Niger, Senegal)
Escudo 1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
(Cape-Verde)
Franc 1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
(Guinea)
Dalasi 1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
(Gambia)
Ouguiya 1-Jan-01 to 1-Jul-07 2-Jul-07 to 31-Dec-07 1-Jan-08 to 14-Sep-08
(Mauritania)
C. Currencies without Nominal Superiority Gain
Lira 4-Jan-00 to 31-Dec-04 4-Jan-05 to 30-Dec-05 2-Jan-06 to 28-Apr-06
(Turkey)
Kwacha 1-Jan-07 to 31-Dec-12 1-Jan-13 to 28-Jun-13 1-Jul-13 to 31-Dec-13
(Zambia)
Metical 4-Jan-00 to 30-Jun-06 3-Jul-06 to 29-Dec-06 1-Jan-07 to 29-Jun-07
(Mozambique)
Table 1.2: Data Description for the Exchange Rate Series
This table shows the available data on exchange rate series and the respective time frames used in
the analysis for the transition and post-transition redenomination analysis.
1.4 Results
In this section, I present the results of the analysis categorized into two subsections. First, I
present the changes in both the exchange rate level and volatility of the Ghana Cedi which
experienced nominal superiority gain against the USD after the redenomination policy.
To further relate the uniqueness of the changes observed in the Ghana Cedi to the policy,
I present the results of the non-redenominated currencies in the West-African region as
of the same time the Ghana Cedi experienced the redenomination. Finally, I present the
results of the other redenominated currencies with no changes in their nominal superiority
against the USD. In the Second subsection, I present the results of the causality test carried
out to check if other changes in the economic variables might have led to the depreciation
instead of the hypothesized nominal superiority shock caused by the redenomination.
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1.4.1 Currency Changes
Currency with Nominal Superiority Gain & Event Study
The results of this analysis as shown in table-1.3 and table-A.1 give a clear indication of
the impact of nominal superiority shock on the exchange rate. First, under the transition
period, the Ghana Cedi’s exchange rate sharply depreciated just after the policy. This sharp
depreciation can be seen both from the difference and detrended conditional mean and
variance models displayed on figure-A.1 and figure-A.2 respectively. Using the percentage-
difference formula from equation-1.5, the Ghana Cedi depreciates by a daily average
of 1.34% and 1.39% above its forecasted path when the differenced conditional mean
and variance model is applied. Additionally, by detrending the series and applying the
conditional mean and variance model, the realized exchange rate trend significantly moves
upward compared to the forecasted path further indicating a depreciation in the exchange
rate.
During the same transition period, however, the currencies of the neighboring West-
African countries with no concurrent redenomination policy are rather oscillating19 or
insignificantly appreciating relative to their forecasted path. An exception is made in
the case of Guinea Franc under the differenced conditional mean and variance model. I
find an initial appreciation in the early stages of the transition period and depreciation
thereafter. This subsequent depreciation in the series can be explained by the sudden break
experienced in the series few months prior (i.e. April 2007). Using the second competing
model detrended model to account for the breaks in the series, I find an oscillatory result
for the Guinea Franc.
Second, in the post transition period, a consistent pattern of continuous depreciation
in the Ghana Cedi can be observed. The Ghana Cedi depreciates by an average daily
percentage of 4.71% and 5.05% above its forecasted path under the post transition period.
Trend-wise, the actual exchange rate moves above the forecasted trend. Furthermore, given
the significant break in path observed in the transition period, the new model (i.e. combine)
displayed on figure-1.2 and figure-1.3 which uses only the pre-redenomination data also
shows a significant depreciation (i.e. 3.95% and 4.2% with significant upward trend). On
the contrary, there are no significant changes in the West African currencies relative to the
USD.
In examining the uncertainty of the exchange rate via the volatility framework, I find an
increased volatility in the Ghana Cedi’s exchange rate. This increased volatility is evident
in both the transition period and post transitionary phase. A further analysis of uncertainty
using data close to the policy date shows significant volatility increase. In contrast, most of
the West African currencies experience a stable volatility in their exchange rates during
19(That is, movement up and down the forecasted path)
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these periods. Figure-1.4 and figure-1.5 show the graphical display of the volatility under
the difference and detrended models respectively.
The combination of a persistent depreciation and increased volatility of the Ghana Cedi
in both the transition and post-transition periods give strong evidence to support the effect
of currency redenomination on the exchange rate. Additionally, the lack of evidence of
significant changes in the neighboring West-African currencies during the same period
lends credence to the uniqueness of the depreciation observed in the newly redenominated
Ghana Cedi.
1. LEVEL AND TREND GRAPHS20
DIFFERENCED CONDITIONAL MEAN AND VARIANCE MODEL



















MC Simulated Forex Forecast: Ghana Cedi relative to USD Exchange Rate







Figure 1.2: Level Movement: Cedi vs USD: Truncated (Jan-2007 to May-2008)
20The graphs (i.e. figures 1.2,1.3, A.1 and A.2) have been truncated for better visualization of the exchange
rate movement after the policy. The original starting point is January-2001. The truncation does not affect the
results in anyway.
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DETRENDED CONDITIONAL MEAN AND VARIANCE MODEL














MC Simulated Forex Forecast: Ghana Cedi relative to USD Exchange Rate







Figure 1.3: Level Movement: Cedi vs USD: Truncated (Jan-2007 to May- 2008)
2. VARIANCE/VOLATILITY GRAPHS
DIFFERENCED: CONDITIONAL VARIANCE MODEL















MC Simulated Conditional Variance of Ghana Cedi relative to Cedi






Figure 1.4: Volatility (Differenced): Cedi vs USD (Jan-2006 to Dec-2007)
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DETRENDED: CONDITIONAL VARIANCE MODEL












MC Simulated Conditional Variance of Ghana Cedi relative to Cedi






Figure 1.5: Volatility (Detrended): Cedi vs USD (Jan-2006 to Dec-2007)
Result 1: Exchange Rate of Ghana Cedi Currencies relative to USD
Currency Stationarity Final Model Period Forecast Level: Volatility
Transition MC Depreciation (1.39%**) Increased
MMSE Depreciation (1.34%**)
Differenced I(1) ARIMA(0,1,[1,3])GARCH(1,1) Post MC Depreciation (5.05%**) Increased
Ghana MMSE Depreciation (4.71%**)
(Cedi) Combine MC Depreciation (4.2%**) Increased
MMSE Depreciation (3.95%**)
Transition MC Upward Trend** Increased
Detrended MMSE Upward Trend**
(Breakpoints) Post MC Upward Trend** Increased
1.(5/23/2002) ARIMA(1,0,1)GARCH(1,1) MMSE Upward Trend**
2.(11/27/2003) Combine MC Upward Trend** Increased
MMSE Upward Trend**
Table 1.3: Result of Ghana Cedi vs USD
This table summarizes the results obtained from the analyses of the Ghana Cedi relative to USD
both in the transition and post-transition period. I(1) under the stationarity column represents
the integration of order one whiles the breakpoints shows the endogenously determined dates
of break in movement of the currency. The respective lag orders for the conditional mean and
variance are shown in the Final Model column. (**) represents the 5% level of significance.
Non-Nominal Superior Redenominated Currencies
To strengthen the nominal superiority hypothesis espoused in this paper, I go a step further
to analyze the currencies with redenomination experience in the recent past. The results of
this analysis displayed on table-A.2 show some interesting findings and can be summarized
in three key points. First, consistent with the nominal changes in the exchange rates, I
find a slight depreciation in all the currencies during the transition period. However,
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the depreciation rates in the currencies were insignificant. Second, no significant change
is observed when the new currency became the only legal tender in the post transition
period. Last, the volatility in these exchange rates remain stable. Overall, the results from
this sub-section further validates the nominal superiority shock hypothesis as none of
these currencies (i.e. without the nominal superiority shock after the policy) experienced
significant depreciation.
1.4.2 Causality Test on Macroeconomic Variables
Using the Granger-causality test (Granger (1969)), I examine key macroeconomic variables
known to theoretically have an impact on the exchange rate movements (see Krugman et al.
(2017)). This analysis is to help ascertain whether the changes observed in the Ghana Cedi
came from these variables instead of the hypothesized nominal superiority shock effect.
I sample the monthly frequency variables from Thomson-Reuters-Eikon (2017) starting
from the year 2001 to 2008. To establish the true causality effect, a two-period analysis
is conducted. First, I examine the historical (i.e. pre-redenomination) relationship and
causality between the variables and the exchange rate using data from January 2001 to
June 2007. This historical analysis helps explain any past sensitivity of the Ghana Cedi’s
exchange rate to the changes in macroeconomic variables. Second, using the entire dataset,
an overall analysis is conducted to examine the effect of the variables on the exchange rate
as of the time of implementing the redenomination policy.
To commence the causality test, I check for the stationarity property of the variables
as required. As typical with macroeconomic variables, the variables are found to be non-
stationary. In view of the non-stationary nature of the variables, I examine the cointegrated
relationship between the variables and the exchange rate (see Johansen (1995)). In the
presence of any cointegration, a suitable Vector Error Correction model (i.e. VEC) is fitted
and a modified Granger-causality test by Toda & Yamamoto (1995) conducted on the esti-
mated VEC model. In the absence of any cointegration, however, the variable is differenced
to ensure stationarity and a Vector Autoregression model (i.e. VAR-in-difference model)
estimated. A standard Granger-causality test is then conducted on the VAR-in-difference
model. Finally, an ideal lag value (2 lag orders which is equivalent to two months) is chosen
to efficiently determine for the macroeconomic variables in order to ascertain how their
past movement might have affected to the changes in the exchange.
The results of this causality analysis displayed on table-1.4 show that none of the
macroeconomic variables Granger-causes the Ghana Cedi exchange rate movement. The
results hold true both historically (i.e. before implementation of the policy) and during the
policy’s implementation. This further proves that the depreciation of the redenominated
Ghana Cedi is due to the nominal superiority shock caused by the redenomination and not
changes in the economic fundamentals.
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Causality Analysis
Macroeconomic Timeline Cointegration Lag Observation Hypothesis P-value Decision
Variable (Before & After (Model) Order 6=⇒ (not Granger Cause)
Redenomination)
Before No Coint. 2 78 0.3790 Fail to
Inflation (VAR-in-diff.) Inf lation 6=⇒ Exc.Rate Reject
Overall No Coint. 2 89 0.3003 Fail to
(VAR-in-diff.) Reject
Before No Coint. 2 64 0.0503 Fail to
International (VAR-in-diff.) Resevres 6=⇒ Exc.Rate Reject
Reserve Overall Yes Coint. 2 70 0.3778 Fail to
VECM Reject
Before Yes Coint. 2 66 0.6782 Fail to
Interest VECM Int.Rate 6=⇒ Exc.Rate Reject
Rate Overall No Coint. 2 77 0.8017 Fail to
(VAR-in-diff.) Reject
Before Yes Coint. 2 66 0.9655 Fail to
Money VECM MoneySup. 6=⇒ Exc.Rate Reject
Supply Overall No Coint. 2 77 0.7449 Fail to
(VAR-in-diff.) Reject
Before No Coint. 2 42 0.1939 Fail to
Trade (VAR-in-diff.) T radeBal. 6=⇒ Exc.Rate Reject
Balance Overall No Coint. 2 53 0.3228 Fail to
(VAR-in-diff.) Reject
Table 1.4: Causality Analysis
This table gives a detailed description of causality analysis of the Ghana Cedi’s exchange rate
with respect to five key macroeconomic variables. At 5% level of significance, none of the
macroeconomic variables Granger-caused the changes in the Ghana Cedi exchange rate. Also,
there is lack of evidence to support historical Granger-causality effect of these variables on the
exchange rate. "Coint." from the 3rd column of the table stands for cointegration and "Exc.Rate"
on the 6th column stands for exchange rate.
1.5 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of the chosen models used in the forecasting analysis, I conduct
three different robustness tests. First, I examine prediction accuracy of the model prior
to the redenomination period. To test this, I reserve 10% of the in-sample data (i.e. from
6th November, 2006 to 29th June, 2007). I then use the generated conditional mean and
variance model to forecast the in-sample data path. A comparison between the reserved
in-sample data and the forecast figures is then made. The result of the performance test on
the ARIMA-GARCH model for the Ghana Cedi relative to the USD is remarkably good in
its predictive accuracy: only 0.6% deviation of the actual from forecasted path.
Second, I examine the normality assumption of the final standardized residuals. This test
is done by plotting the kernel density and normality graphs of the standardized residuals of
the selected conditional mean and variance model. Furthermore, I check for the non-serial
correlation assumption of the final standardized residuals by plotting the ACF and PACF
graphs. The results of the robustness checks displayed on figures-1.6, figure-1.7, figure-
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A.3 and figure-A.4 show that the models meet the normality and non-serial correlation
requirements.
Third, I study the movement in the Ghana Cedi relative to the second major trading
currency (i.e. Euro). This is a relevant currency to test the nominal superiority assumption
as the Ghana Cedi did not gain any nominal superiority relative to the Euro (i.e. 1.266
Ghana Cedi per Euro). As postulated, the analysis finds an upward insignificant changes
in the exchange rate path of the Ghana Cedi to the Euro during the transition and post
transition. This insignificance in the movement could be explained by the closeness of the
new currency to the nominal superior point.
Diagram of ACF/PACF plots
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Figure 1.6: Diagram of ACF/PACF Plots
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Diagram of QQ and Normality plots





























QQ Plot of Sample Data versus Standard Normal Kernel
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Figure 1.7: Diagram of QQ and Normality plots
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the impact of currency redenomination and its associated nominal
superiority shock on exchange rates using a time series forecasting approach with insights
from nominal illusion literature. Using daily exchange rates of redenominated currency
with nominal superiority gain (i.e. Ghana Cedi relative to the USD), I find evidence in
support of exchange rate depreciation coupled with an increased volatility.
To further support the nominal superiority shock findings, I conduct three separate
tests. First, I examine three different redenominated currencies without nominal superiority
gains to the USD. These currencies are selected based on their shared experience with
Ghana (i.e. timing of the policy, non-fixed exchange rate policy and regional proximity). As
postulated, my analysis shows no significant change in their exchange rates.
Second, I examine the uniqueness in the depreciation of the Ghana Cedi’s exchange rate
during the redenomination by analyzing the exchange rates of its neighboring West-African
currencies with no concurrent redenomination policies.This further regional analysis is to
help ascertain whether any regional exchange rate shock might have been the contributing
factor instead of the hypothesized nominal superiority shock caused by the redenomination.
Contrary to the depreciation of the Ghana Cedi, this event study shows that none of the
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regional currencies experienced any significant depreciation against the USD. Furthermore,
unlike the increased volatility seen in the Ghana Cedi, these regional currencies were mostly
stable. The outcome of this regional currency analysis further strengthens the argument
that the changes observed in the Ghana Cedi’s exchange rate are not regional but rather
unique to the redenominated Ghana Cedi.
Third, to further ensure that the depreciation of the Ghana Cedi is specifically related
to the redenomination policy, I conduct a causality test using the VAR/VECM and Granger-
causality test on key macroeconomic variables which may contribute to changes in exchange
rates. This causality test shows that none of macroeconomic variables caused the changes
in the exchange rate during the redenomination. Also, the announcement and sensitization
effort by the Central Bank of Ghana indicates no implementation of simultaneous policies
during the redenomination as the value of the currency was expected to remain unchanged.
These results further lend credence to the effect of redenomination and its associated
nominal superiority gain on the exchange rates. The importance of the result cannot be
overlooked given the number of countries adopting the redenomination policy. Ironically,
inflation (i.e. the primary economic reason for adopting currency redenomination) might
be worsened given the associated depreciation of the currency that accompanies the re-
denomination policies with nominal superiority shock. This could be the case especially
for import dependent economies since a depreciated currency could lead to higher cost of
import thereby increasing the cost of commodities. Furthermore, an increase in the nominal
interest rate level might arise in wake of increased inflation and less available capital which
further slows down the economy. Last but not least, a depreciated currency might lead to
currency crisis and capital flight thus reducing foreign investment.
Considering the potential negative consequences of the nominal superiority shock
associated with redenomination21, it is worthwhile for prospective countries to analyze
possible behavioral implications of the redenomination policy prior to its implementation.
Interested countries should consider the appropriate number of zeros to delete or add by
juxtaposing their currency to a major trading currency to prevent the nominal superiority
shock seen in Ghana (i.e. using the USD as a reference point). This will help reduce the
impact of currency demand as predicted by the nominal illusion findings.
In hindsight, a policy recommendation which would have helped prevent the nominal
superiority shock and subsequent depreciation of the Ghana Cedi would have been a
reduction of at most 3 zeros instead of the 4 zeros. With 3 zeros off the currency, the
exchange rate would have changed from 9,298 Ghana Cedi per USD to 9.298 Ghana Cedi
per USD preventing nominal superiority shock. This recommended change, however, might
lead to a marginal increase in transaction cost with regards to the amount of currency
needed for daily transactions.
21Currency depreciation, increased inflation, increased interest rate, and capital flight
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Chapter 2
Evidencing Forex Illusion under
Currency Redenomination:
An Experimental Approach
This paper examines the emergence of foreign-exchange illusion following a currency
redenomination policy. To study this nominal bias, I conduct an incentivized experiment
where participants make currency conversion decisions that determine their demand for
goods in two economies. Across participants, I vary the nominal exchange rate and price
level. The demand for foreign exchange depends significantly on the relative price level
between the two economies, with relatively high prices attracting greater demand for
that economy’s currency. Consistent with foreign exchange illusion, participants with a
lower nominal exchange rate convert significantly less of their currency compared to their
counterparts with high nominal exchange rate regardless of the price level.
2.1 Introduction
Currency redenomination is the process where a country changes the nominal value of its
currency. This is typically done by adding or removing zeros to existing face values of a
country’s currency. Countries mostly redenominate their currencies to alleviate the trans-
actional challenges associated with earlier hyperinflation episodes (Mosley (2005)). These
challenges include the need for large amount of paper money for smaller transactions lead-
ing to increased risk (i.e. theft) and accounting difficulties1. Furthermore, such currencies
lose their value and appeal on the international front due to persistent depreciation.
Faced with these difficulties, central banks resort to currency redenomination policy
through the removal of excess nominal figures from their currency. Such a policy is believed
to make the currency more appealing since fewer banknotes and coins are necessary for
1Imagine buying a meal or 3 eggs and paying in billions (The-Herald-Sun (2008))
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transactions. Ghana, Turkey, Zambia, Mozambique, Mauritania and Zimbabwe are among
the numerous countries to have implemented the currency redenomination policy since
2000.
Behaviorally, however, currency redenomination can give rise to the possibility of
nominal bias. Studies have shown that nominal changes have the tendency of influencing
individual’s behavior2. On currency redenomination for instance, Dzokoto et al. (2010) find
evidence to support the presence of money illusion after the policy’s implementation in
Ghana. Additional evidence on the introduction of new currencies and money illusion can
be found in studies by Bittschi & Duppel (2015), Cannon & Cipriani (2006) and Amelia
et al. (2002). Also, empirical findings by Žídek & Michal (2015) and Karnadi & Adijaya
(2017) show changes in price fluctuations (i.e. inflation) due to currency redenomination.
On the foreign exchange market front, redenomination automatically leads to an ad-
justment to a new nominal exchange rate of the redenominated currency. With these
adjustments, the potential of emergence of nominal bias on the foreign currency demand
(i.e. forex illusion) is imminent especially in partially-dollarized economies where USD
and other foreign currencies are held for import and inflation reasons. For instance, the
currency redenomination of the Ghana Cedi meant the nominal quotation of the Ghana
Cedi to the USD had to adjust from 9,298 Old Ghana Cedi per USD to 0.9298 New Ghana
Cedi per USD. With this substantial nominal change, the Ghana Cedi which is a historically
poor performing currency relative to USD, has now gained a nominal superiority against
the USD since the USD can be purchased with less than a unit of the Ghana Cedi in nominal
terms.
With the valuable USD now appearing cheaper, the nominal illusion hypothesis is that
economic agents will increase their demand for USD, thereby leading to its appreciation and
subsequent depreciation of the domestic currency (Ghana Cedi). In a time series analysis of
exchange rate movements of the Ghana Cedi relative to the USD after the redenomination,
I find evidence of substantial depreciation of the Ghana Cedi further lending credence to
the hypothesized currency demand changes (Abdul-Salam (Unpublished)).
To validate this hypothesis behaviorally, I investigate for the first time in an incentivized
experimental setup the presence of foreign currency illusion (i.e. forex illusion) in an agent’s
decision. To examine this forex illusion, I primarily design an experiment capable of testing
the validity of homogeneity of degree zero (HODZ) assumption in prices and exchange rates.
That is, with equal changes in prices and exchange rates, optimization behavior should
remain unchanged. Data collected from the optimization decision of the various nominal
treatment groups are analyzed to examine any deviation from the optimization point and
2See Kahneman et al. (1986), Shafir et al. (1997), Fehr & Tyran (2001), Cannon & Cipriani (2006), Fehr &
Tyran (2007), Fehr & Tyran (2008), Brunnermeier & Julliard (2008), Schmeling & Schrimpf (2011), Petersen &
Winn (2014), and Yamamori et al. (2018)
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potential violation of the HODZ assumption. Instances where participants are swayed by
their respective nominal exchange rate values from the optimal point as well as differences
in their respective decision points is deemed as violation of the HODZ assumption hence
forex illusion.
The contribution of this paper is to provide causal evidence that redenomination has
important implications for the relative demand for currency. I assess the currency demand
in a multi-currency laboratory setting where participants are asked to make currency
holding decisions under various nominal currency quotations. These currency decisions
automatically determine how much a person buys in domestic and foreign markets.
I experimentally vary the decision environment along two key dimensions. First, I
vary the addition and removal of zeros to the domestic currency to assess the effects of
redenomination on the relative demand for domestic currency. Second, in these high (i.e.
addition of zeros; high rate) and low (i.e. removal of zeros; low rate) nominal exchange rate
regimes, I also vary the posted prices in the domestic market relative to the foreign market.
Along these 4 different treatment variations, I explore the robustness of forex illusion by
further varying the uncertainty about prices and the exchange rate when making a spending
decision. These variations are consistent and realistic scenarios faced by consumers in these
partially-dollarized economies.
Under the forex illusion hypothesis, participants presented with low nominal exchange
rates (LNER henceforth) are predicted to convert less of their domestic currency to purchase
the foreign currency relative to their counterparts presented with high nominal exchange
rates (HNER henceforth). This prediction is consistent with the nominal illusion findings
where higher nominal values might be associated with higher payoffs thereby attracting
higher conversion rate. The experimental findings are consistent with this theoretical
prediction as well as correspond to the empirical observation in the movement of the Ghana
Cedi exchange rate. Overall, LNER participants convert less of their domestic currency
compared to their HNER counterparts. The lower conversion rate in the LNER treatment
can be inferred as depreciation in the low nominal rate currency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly discusses existing
research on nominal illusion and currency demand, Section 2.3 presents a model designed
to understand how forex illusion can emerge in participants’ spending decisions as well as
the layout of the experimental design, Section 2.4 presents the results of the experiment,
and Section 2.5 concludes by discussing the economic implication of the result with some
policy recommendations.
2.2 Literature Review
Money illusion is a long-studied phenomenon about the effects of nominal framing on
economic decision-making (Fisher (1928)). Particularly, it is the idea that economic agents
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consider nominal irrelevant factors when making decisions. Skepticism surrounding this
topic has been significant given the standard assumption in economics where agents are
assumed to be rational. Growing empirical and experimental evidence however support
the nominal illusion’s assertion.
Some of the earliest evidence of money illusion was observed by Shafir et al. (1997).
Their survey experiment found that nominal values play an important role in agents’
hypothetical valuations of economic transactions. Fehr & Tyran (2001) advanced the study
of money illusion with an incentivized experimental design. Their study comprised of
both direct (i.e. individual level money illusion) and indirect (others’ money illusion)
levels of money illusion. Using two main payoff setups (real vs nominal and computer vs
human in terms of opponents), the authors concluded that even though the direct level
was minimal, its effect in generating aggregate nominal inertia under negative shock could
be substantial. In a follow up study, Petersen & Winn (2014) found limited evidence of
individual level money illusion even though they found support for higher order money
illusion. Extending nominal illusion to an inter-temporal decision setting, Yamamori et al.
(2018) found evidence in support of this behavioral bias where agents savings decision were
significantly affected by the nominal values. It is worthwhile to note that recent studies have
proposed opposing explanations instead of money illusion in agents’ irrational decision
(Grundmann et al. (2019))3.
Few studies have advanced this nominal bias to foreign currency and product valuation.
Raghubir & Srivastava (2002) for instance, investigated the effects of nominal quotation
on participants’ product evaluation. Within an in-class experiment, the authors presented
students with a product and ask for their hypothetical willingness to spend under various
nominal currency settings. Notably, students were only able to give their hypothetical
willingness to pay in a single currency at any point in time hence limiting their ability to
make simultaneous currency demands. The results of their study showed that students
presented with higher nominal currency quotations exhibit a lower willingness to pay.
Wertenbroch et al. (2007) extended the study by Raghubir & Srivastava (2002) through the
introduction of salient budget constraints. They found an opposing result to Raghubir &
Srivastava (2002): high nominal quotations increased students’ willingness to pay. Finally,
Amelia et al. (2002) found mixed results as participants in one study deemed products
as less expensive when currency quotation is in larger units and vice-versa in another
experiment.
Unlike the existing studies with the contrasting findings on the product and currency
valuation setting, the objective of this paper is to examine for the first time an experimental
setting the direct effect of nominal exchange rates on currency demand. In that respect, the
3Using a wage with gift-exchange setting, the study found that participants’ decision on nominal values can
be explained by intention rather than hypothesized nominal illusion.
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experimental design and inference from this study varies significantly from the existing
studies. First, I consider the coexistence of multiple currencies whereby participants can
purchase goods in either or all currencies given a clearly specified budget constraint. This
setting better describes the challenges facing consumers in partially dollarized economies
and can shed light on foreign currency demand decisions. Second, the price of a good
is not subjected to participants’ willingness to pay but rather an objective posted price
which all participants adhere to. With the introduction of an objective posted price, I
assess participants’ decisions relative to the optimal demand. Third, participants in this
experiment face an incentive-compatible budgeting decision instead of a hypothetical
setting. Fourth, I explore robustly the effects of uncertainty in prices and exchange rates
on currency demand decisions, both of which are realistic challenges facing consumers in
partially-dollarized economies. Taken together, the experimental design allows for direct
inference about the effects of redenomination on currency demand.
2.3 Theoretical Prediction and Experimental Design
In this section, I design a laboratory experiment to identify and understand the robust-
ness of forex-illusion across different nominal frames and information contexts. Using a
standard microeconomic assumption, I also outline how rational and nominally biased
economic agents should respond to nominal changes in exchange rates. Finally, I present
the hypothesis to be examined as well as the statistical test used under each hypothesis.
2.3.1 Experimental Design
A currency demand experiment where participants make conversion decisions given nomi-
nal exchange rates and prices of goods is designed using a constant elasticity of substitution
utility function (CES utility henceforth). A CES utility henceforth is chosen for this design
primarily due its diminishing marginal returns property. The diminishing returns property
encourages diversification of a currency portfolio to maximize payoff. CES utility function
is also simple to understand and implement in an experiment.
The CES utility induced in this experiment comprises of two separate but identical
goods (i.e. Good A and Good B) which can be purchased using the associated currencies.
That is, in order to purchase Good B, participants must convert their original currency
holding which is issued in currency A to currency B. This intra-temporal maximization
decision participants make can be summarized as follows:
maximize
A,B







where A and B represent the demand for Good A and Good B, PA and PB represent prices of
Good A and Good B respectively, E represents the nominal exchange rate of currency A to
currency B, and MA represents the initial currency endowment issued in currency A.
Consistent with this theoretical framework, the experiment is primarily designed to
collect the key Good A and Good B maximization variables. These variables are however
related to the participants currency holding. That is, using their initial currency endowment
issued in currency A, participants are tasked to first make a currency conversion decision
which will determine the amount of Good A and Good B to purchase as well as their points.
The experimental design combines both within and between participants variation to
understand how nominal exchange rate framing and information influence the demand
for currency. Each participant makes five independent currency decisions under a given
nominal exchange rate and relative price level. These two treatment dimensions will be
discussed in further detail shortly.
First, round 1 presents participants with complete information about the nominal
exchange rate of the currencies needed to purchase the respective goods as well as the
prices of each good. The nominal exchange rate and prices of goods in this round are
stable with no uncertainty. In round 2, the nominal exchange rate of the foreign currency is
allowed to fluctuate leading to uncertainty in the exchange rate. Round 3 instead introduces
uncertainty in the price levels with the possibility of a potential increase or decrease in
the foreign price. Finally, both rounds 4 and round 5 expand the set of foreign goods and
currencies to two (i.e. good/currency B and C) with the option to select one with shared
features (stable prices and exchange rate) as round 1. There is however a key difference
between round 4 and round 5 in terms of the price information. Whereas round 4 presents
participants qualitative information on the price difference between the local and foreign
goods, round 5 presents quantitative information. These five variations characterized in
each of the five rounds are selected because of their shared features with partially-dollarized
economies (complete and incomplete price and exchange rate information). Tables 2.1 and
sample experiment in appendix-B give further description of the rounds with regards to
the parameters and design display respectively.
The nominal framing of exchange rates is varied between independent groups of subjects
to understand the effects of redenomination. In the HNER (high) treatment, participants
face a foreign exchange rate that is greater than one (e.g. 1 unit of Currency Unit of
A = 15 units of Currency B). In the LNER(low) treatment, the foreign exchange rate is
less than one (e.g. 1 unit of Currency Unit of A = 0.15 units of Currency B). Additional
treatments exploring the effects of the magnitude of exchange rate changes can be found in
the Appendix.
In a second dimension of the design, I vary between participants the relative prices of
the two economies. That is, setting with relative expensive foreign goods (expensive) and
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vice-versa (cheap). Holding each price setting constant, I examine the conversion decision of
the two nominal treatment groups to accurately access their nominal bias. This additional
price dimension further provides a robust understanding of how currency demand and
forex-illusion is mediated by the relative price level.
2.3.2 Implementation
To implement this experiment, I follow standard experimental procedures. First, prior to
the five rounds, participants are asked to sign a consent form detailing their willingness
to participate in the experiment. A follow up instruction and quiz is administered to
help improve comprehension of the experiment (Freeman et al. (2018)). Each of the five
main rounds has a what-if-calculator available for participants in making their conversion
decision and lasts for 15 minutes. Participants receive feedback on their decision in a form
of points and cash equivalent at the end of each round with exception of round 2 which is
shown together with round 3 feedback. A randomly selected round from the five rounds is
selected as the payment round.
Furthermore, to conform with the Ghanaian experience, I sample a total of 119 partici-
pants from a general student population in Ghana (i.e. Greater Accra Region (University of
Ghana, Legon), Ashanti Region (Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology,
Kumasi) and Western Region (University of Mines and Technology, Tarkwa)). Each partic-
ipant is allowed to partake in only one of the experiments. The experiment is designed
using oTree (Chen et al. (2016)) with a unique participation link forwarded to participants
on their computers. Participants receive payment from one of the randomly chosen rounds
in addition to an initial payment ( show up fee). In total, the average amount paid to
participants is 5 Ghana Cedis which is equivalent to the average breakfast and lunch cost
for students in Ghana.
2.3.3 Demand/Payoff Function
A standard microeconomic assumption is that agents exhibit homogeneity of degree zero in
their demand for goods. That is, an increase in the price associated with an equal increase
in money balances should lead to zero change in demand. Under money illusion, the
homogeneity condition is violated as agents disregard the associated change in prices
leading to real changes in demand. In the context of this experiment, foreign exchange
illusion presents itself as a violation of the homogeneity of degree zero condition, whereby
agents disregard the associated price changes when observing a nominal exchange rate
change due to redenomination.
The solution for optimal demand for currency/good (i.e. Marshallian Demand) shown
on equation-2.2 has both unique solution and homogeneous of degree zero properties. First,
the optimal solution to the problem faced by all the participants in the nominal treatment
groups is the same. This uniqueness property ensures that there is a standard reference
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value for comparing decisions by the different treatment groups. Second, the solution has a
homogeneous of degree zero in nominal exchange rate and prices property. The implication
of this homogeneity property is that equivalent changes in nominal exchange rate and
prices should not alter participants conversion decision. Violating this property establishes
a strong evidence for the presence of forex-illusion. Equation-2.2 to 2.4 below show the


















Optimal Amount of Currency A =⇒ C∗A = PAA
∗
Optimal Amount of Currency B =⇒ C∗B =MA − PAA
∗
(2.3)
Proof of Homogeneity of Degree Zero and Forex-illusion;
• Proof of HODZ:
Multiply the nominal exchange rate and Price-B by λ in A∗ solution
=⇒ (λ ∗E)
αMa(Pa)α−1
(λ ∗EPa)α + (λ ∗ Pb)α






Hence there should be no change in demand of A* based nominal exchange rate
• Proof of Forex-illusion:
Now, assume agents places different weights on the nominal exchange rate (λe), then:
=⇒ A(λe) =
(λe ∗E)αMa(Pa)α−1
(λe ∗EPa)α + (λ ∗ Pb)α
(2.5)
Hence, demand for Good A and B will depend on the nominal exchange rate with
higher nominal rate leading to upward conversion bias (λe(bias) ↑) and lower nominal
rate otherwise (λe(bias) ↓).
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2.3.4 Hypothesis
To properly understand forex-illusion and make valid conclusion on its existence, I exam-
ine two different hypothesis based on differences in the treatment and optimality of the
conversion rate. The subsections below give a detail breakdown of both test;
Hypothesis-A: Difference between Treatment
Here, I examine the difference in the conversion rate between the two treatment groups.
Forex illusion hypothesizes that LNER participants have a lower conversion rate com-
pared to their HNER counterparts. Using the simple regression equation-2.6, I test for the
hypothesis-A on equation-2.7.
y1it =Diβ + x
′
itθi + εit (2.6)
Di =
1 if Treatment = LNER.0 if Treatment = HNER.
where y1it represents the difference between the participants conversion rate and the
optimal conversion rate, Di represents the dummy variable, β is the coefficient on the
treatment dummy ,x′it is the vector of control variables and εit is the error term.
Hypothesis-A: LNER convert less than HNER participants.
Hnull : β ≥ 0
Halternative : β ≤ 0
(2.7)
Hypothesis-B: Comparison to Optimal Solution
Using the regression equation-2.8, I examine further how the participants in each group
performed relative to the optimal point under the respective price settings. To do this, I






2itθi + εit (2.8)
where y2it represents conversion rate, x′1it is the optimal conversion for each round, x
′
2it
is the vector of controls and εit is the error term. I test for the significant γ = 1 where failure
to reject indicates optimal conversion by the participants.
Hypothesis-B: Base on price setting, participants conversion rate matches the optimal rate.
Hnull : γ = 1




Table 2.1: Parameters under Price Settings
1. Expensive Price Nominal Exchange Rate
Rounds Endowment Price Choice Optimal HNER LNER
(Good-A, Good-B) (Convert to B$, C$) Conversion
1 70A$ (10A$, 8.5A$) Convert to B$ 24.01 15B$ 0.15B$
(Perfect Information)
2 40A$ (5.5A$, 5.5A$) Convert to B$ 20 20B$ 0.2B$
(Exchange Uncertainty)
3 35A$ (5A$, 4.25A$) Convert to B$ 12.01 10B$ 0.1B$
(Price Uncertainty)
4 80A$ Expensive Good-B Convert to B$ 30.11 350B$ 0.035B$
(Qualitative Price &
Currency Choice)
Expensive Good-C Convert to C$ 1200C$ 0.0012C$
5 80A$ (10.5A$, 8.4A$) Convert to B$ 23.25 350B$ 0.035B$
(Perfect Information) (10.5A$, 8.4A$) Convert to C$ 1200C$ 0.0012C$
Sample Size 30 24
2. Cheap Price
1 70A$ (8.5A$,10.5A$) Convert to B$ 45.99 15B$ 0.15B$
(Perfect Information)
2 40A$ (5.5A$,5.5A$) Convert to B$ 20 20B$ 0.2B$
(Exchange Uncertainty)
3 35A$ (4.25A$,5A$) Convert to B$ 22.99 10B$ 0.1B$
(Price Uncertainty)
4 80A$ Cheaper Good-B Convert to B$ 41 350B$ 0.035B$
(Qualitative Price &
Currency Choice)
Cheaper Good-C Convert to C$ 1200C$ 0.0012C$
5 80A$ (8.4A$,10.5A$) Convert to B$ 56.5 350B$ 0.035B$
(Perfect Information) (8.4A$,10.5A$) Convert to C$ 1200C$ 0.0012C$
Sample Size 29 26
This table gives a detailed description of the parameters per each round including the expected optimal conversion rate.
2.4 Experimental Results
In this section, I present the results of two key forex-illusion hypotheses using the data
from the experiment.
2.4.1 Hypothesis-A Results: Difference between Treatment
The results of the test of difference between the two treatment groups ( hypothesis-A)
displayed on table-2.2 largely support the presence of forex-illusion. First, using the entire
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dataset from both price settings (column-2), I find that LNER participants significantly
converted 13% less than HNER counterparts. This result holds true for both the standard
regression (model-1) and the fixed-effect regression accounting for the rounds (model-2).
Second, partitioning the results on the basis of the respective price setting (column-3 and
column-4), I find a consistent difference between both treatments with LNER participants
converting lesser than HNER counterparts. Specifically, the difference between the treat-
ment groups are much higher in expensive foreign price treatment setting (i.e. LNER
converted 22% more than HNER) compared to the cheap foreign price treatment setting
(LNER converted 9% lesser than HNER).
Furthermore, I find a mixed effect of gender and travelling experience on the conversion
pattern. For instance, gender proved significant in the conversion rate under the cheap
price setting with male-participants converting more 29% than female-participants whilst
travelling experience proved significant under expensive price setting with a unit increment
in one’s travelling experience leading to 9% lesser conversion rate.
Table 2.2: Hypothesis-A Results: Difference between Treatments
Dependent Variable: Percentage Deviation from Optimal (y1it)
Full-Sample Expensive Price Cheap Price
Column-1 Column-2 Column-3 Column-4
Regressors Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2
LNER-Dummy −0.13†† −0.13†† −0.22†† −0.22†† −0.09† −0.09†
(β) (.08) (.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender .04 .04 0.01 0.01 0.29*** 0.29***
(0.07) (0.07) 0.11 (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Travel-Experience -.02 -.02 -0.09* -0.089* 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.027) 0.03
Round-Fixed-Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observation 705 705 335 335 370 370
R-square 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.117 0.08 0.17
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, [Two-sided test* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01] & [One-sided test: † < 0.1 & †† < 0.05 ]
This table gives a detailed description of the differences in conversion pattern between the participants in the experiment. LNER
participants have a lower conversion pattern compared to the HNER participants.
2.4.2 Hypothesis-B Results: Comparison to Optimal Solution
I examine the optimal performance of both the HNER and LNER participants under
the cheap and expensive price settings. Optimally, lower conversion rate leads to higher
payoffs under the expensive foreign price setting while higher conversion rate leads to
higher payoffs in the cheap foreign goods setting. On the basis of nominal illusion theory
where participants consider nominal value as a potential proxy for real payoff, however,
participants are predicted to have a conversion rate different from the optimal predicted
values. Furthermore, this difference between the optimal conversion rate and the predicted
participants conversion rate is expected to differ based on the price setting.
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For instance, under expensive price setting where lesser conversion rate leads to higher
payoffs, HNER participants are predicted to deviate from the optimal conversion rate due
to the high nominal exchange rate attracting them to convert less. The tendency for LNER
participants deviating from optimal is lesser due to the low exchange rate preventing
them from converting more therefore leading to lesser purchase of the expensive foreign
goods. On the contrary, the opposite prediction holds true under the cheap price setting
where higher conversion rate is better (i.e. HNER participants perform better than LNER
participants).
Consistent with the nominal illusion theoretical prediction under the expensive price
setting, I find LNER participants getting closer to the optimal conversion point (γ = 1)
at 5% significance level using standard regression (model-1) compared to their HNER
counterparts. Under the cheap price setting however, I fail to find any significant difference
in the optimal conversion pattern between both treatment groups at 5% significance level.
Finally, gender and one’s traveling experience significantly influenced the conversion
decision. Under both the expensive and cheap price setting for instance, male-participants
in the LNER treatment converted more than female-participants. The effect of travelling
experience is however mixed. Under the expensive price setting and model-1 for instance,
more travelling experience led to a higher conversion pattern under the LNER and lower
conversion pattern under the HNER treatment. On the contrary, the cheap price setting
led to a consistent higher conversion rate for both the LNER and HNER treatment groups.
Table-2.3 gives a detailed description of the optimality results in each price setting.
Table 2.3: Hypothesis-B Results: Comparison to Optimal Solution
Dependent Variable: Conversion Amount per Round (y2it)
Expensive Price Cheap Price
Column-1 Column-2 Column-3 Column-4 Column-5
Regressors LNER HNER LNER HNER
Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2 Model-1 Model-2
Optimal 1.61 1.61 1.78 1.78 .68 .68 .60 .60
(γ) .36 .29 .35 .21 .14 .13 .14 .12
Gender 14.47*** 14.47* -6.46 -6.46 16.13*** 16.13*** .38 .38
4.59 7.52 4.67 9.27 4.06 5.25 4.25 6.19
Travel-Experience 4.21* 4.21 -3.61** -3.61 4.38** 4.38* 6.81** 6.81*
2.24 3.67 1.66 3.29 1.92 2.48 2.64 3.83
Random Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observation 100 100 125 125 95 95 100 100
R-square 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.29 0.32 0.21 0.21
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, [Two-sided test* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01]
This table gives a detailed description of the optimal conversion pattern of the participants in the lab. experiment. LNER subjects
have a better conversion pattern compared to the HNER subjects.
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2.5 Economic Implication and Conclusion
In this paper, I examined the effect of nominal exchange rate on participants’ currency
conversion decision in an incentivized experiment. Participants were assigned to two main
treatment groups based on the nominal exchange rate with two different price settings.
The result of this two by two experimental design showed a consistent pattern of higher
conversion rate in the treatment group presented with high nominal rate and lesser rate of
conversion for the participants in the low treatment group.
By inference, the experimental result can help explain the sharp depreciation of the
Ghana Cedi seen post their currency redenomination conducted in July of 2007 which led
to the reduction in zeros and subsequent low nominal exchange rate of the currency. Taking
clues from this study, one can associate the depreciation of the Ghana Cedi relative to the
USD after the redenomination to the low nominal exchange rate and low demand seen in
this experiment.
The associated economic implication of currency redenomination and forex illusion is of
major concern especially for partially dollarized economies. First, the inferred depreciation
of the currency might lead to increases in import prices thereby increasing inflation and
cost of living. Second, with a depreciated currency, there is a reduction in foreign direct
investment and higher risk of capital flight. Last, interest rate increment as a form depre-
ciation premium is likely to occur in these economies leading to reduction in investment,
GDP and other key macroeconomic variables.
Given these potential negative impacts, central banks should consider carefully the
pros and cons of currency redenomination policies in view of forex illusion prior to its
implementation. As part of considerations, central banks should have a major international
trading currency as a reference point to cutting off their zeros. In the case of Ghana for
instance, the ideal number of zeros the central bank should have removed would have been
three or less. This will prevent any substantial shift in the nominal exchange rate quotation
as well as the pricing of the Ghana Cedi to the USD. Note that with 3 zeros off, the nominal
exchange rate would have moved to 9.298 Ghana Cedi per USD instead of 0.9298 per USD




Guilty Until Proven Otherwise: High
Status and the Burden of Proof under
Socialism
In this paper, we re-examine extant status theory’s central assumption that high-status
actors are beneficiaries of biased evaluations of their audience. While this assumption
is consistent with the principles of free-market capitalism, where societal institutions
encourage and reward individual economic and social aspirations and wealth accumulation,
it is inconsistent with the principles of socialism that view high-status actors as the source
of inequality and seek to remedy it by redistributing the excess wealth of high-status actors
to low-status actors. So, we contend that, in socialist settings, high-status firms invoke
a negative stereotype in the eyes of their evaluators. They may use a firm’s high status
as a heuristic of bad behavior and rule against it. This negative stereotype held against
high-status firms in socialist settings may be more decisive when a left-wing government is
in power, but a high-status firm may demystify the stereotype when its visible actions run
contrary to the stereotype. We find support for our theory in our analysis of the verdicts on
lawsuits between commercial banks in India and their defaulting borrowers in the High
Court of Kerala, an Indian state reputed for its deep-rooted socialist leaning.
3.1 Introduction
A key insight from status research is that rewards in the market are tied to a producer’s
position in the status hierarchy (Podolny (1993)). High-status firms can charge a higher
premium for a given level of quality (Benjamin & Podolny (1999)), source their vital
resources at lower costs (Podolny (1993)) and, remain well informed of market opportunities
(Pollock & Rindova (2003); Stuart et al. (1999)). These advantages enjoyed by high-status
firms mainly stem from altercentric uncertainty: the uncertainty that a firm’s audience
face in evaluating the credibility of its claims (Podolny (2001)). These claims could be
about the quality of a firm’s products (Podolny (1993); Benjamin & Podolny (1999)) or the
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integrity of its actions (Edelman et al. (2011); McDonnell & King (2018)). The audience
resolves altercentric uncertainty using status as a simplifying heuristic: they infer high-
status producers’ claims to be more credible than those of low-status producers (Podolny,
(2005)). When in doubt, the audience tends to give the benefit of it to high-status firms, but
they do not extend the same to low-status firms.
These biases in favor of high-status producers even extend to arenas where the audience
is supposed to evaluate objectively. For instance, sports umpires have been observed to
erroneously adjudicate in favor of high-status players (Kim & King (2014)), and juries
erroneously rule in favor of high-status firms (Sutherland (1949); Edelman et al. (2011);
McDonnell & King (2018)). These studies point to the deep-rooted admiration in a society
for high-status firms (Ridgeway (2014); McDonnell & King (2018); Correll et al. (2017)).
An undesirable consequence of such biased evaluations of high-status firms even in arenas
where it should not matter is that it enables these firms to reproduce their status-based
advantages while unintendedly perpetuating inequality in markets and society (DiPrete
& Eirich (2006); Ridgeway (2014); Correll et al. (2017); McDonnell & King (2018)). An
outcome that is widely known as the Matthew effect (Merton (1968)).
While the Matthew effect is consistent with the principles of Free Market Capitalism
(Bodkin (2001); Rigney (2010)), where societal institutions reward individual economic
and social aspirations and wealth accumulation (Weber (1905)), it is inconsistent with the
principles of socialism that seek to reduce societal inequality by redistributing wealth
from the rich to the poor (Marx (2004)). The rise of state socialism in several countries
has its origins in uprisings against the Mathew Effect in markets and society. Communist
dictatorships, such as those found in China and the former USSR, made it their mission
to wipe out any class distinctions in markets and society. Apart from the socialist and
communist regimes, cardcarrying capitalist powers such as the US and UK also have
witnessed the rise of socialist sentiments that seek to make markets a level playing field
(Gautney (2018); Howard (2019)). The Occupy Movement, for instance, emerged from the
disillusionment of the working class in the US with the reward structure of free-market
capitalism. It is not evident that status-based advantages documented in prior research
have universal application outside the free markets and even on its fringes. The universality
of status-based benefits comes into question, especially in evaluating producers’ integrity
claims, which is harder to verify (Jonsson et al. (2009)) and more amenable to abuse by
high-status actors (Mishina et al. (2010)). But our understanding of audience’ status-based
evaluations of producers’ claims is primarily based on evidence from the US, where the
burden of proof is not on the high-status producer but on its audience.
In this paper, we propose that a producer’s status can be a burden for it in the courtroom
in socialist settings. Whereas prior research based on capitalist settings demonstrates that
the high status of a firm comes to its rescue in the courtroom (Edelman et al. (2011);
McDonnell & King (2018)), we argue that in socialist settings, occupying a high-status
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position can hurt a firm’s chances of getting a favorable verdict. In making this argument,
we depart from prior research on capitalist settings by re-evaluating the assumptions about
the stereotype held about high status firms by their audience. Although our central premise
that status considerations loom large when there is ambiguity in evaluating a firm’s claims
is consistent with prior research findings in capitalist settings, our point of departure rests
on the direction of the status based bias. When a court in a capitalist setting evaluates a
firm’s culpability in a lawsuit with its weaker stakeholders, it tends to use the firm’s status
as a heuristic of good behavior and rule in favor of the high-status firm, but in a socialist
setting, the court will use a firm’s status as a heuristic of bad behavior and rule against the
high-status firm.
To evaluate our revised assumption’s soundness, we consider two boundary conditions:
the strength of the negative stereotype held by the evaluators at the time of the ruling
and the alignment of the firm’s visible actions with that stereotype. We expect that our
assumptions about the negative stereotype held against high-status firms by the judiciary
will be stronger when socialist sentiments are more robust in the jurisdiction – i.e. when a
left-wing party is in power in the state. But we expect that the stereotype may be demystified
when the high-status actor’s visible actions contradict it – i.e. when they have demonstrated
social responsibility.
We test these ideas in the Indian state of Kerala that has attracted much scholarly atten-
tion due to its socialist development model (Jeffrey (2016); Deshpande (2000); Desai (2002);
Jensen (2007); Gibson (2012)). It is the first state in India to have an elected communist
government as early as 1951. It was also the first to implement land for the tiller and
the right to education, designed to wipe out inequality. The state has also taken notable
initiatives to make the market a level playing field, such as easier access to credit and better
infrastructure for small businesses. Due to its strong left-leaning, it is to date the only state
in India where the Bharatiya Janata Party, India’s dominant right-wing party that rules the
central government with a supermajority, does not even have a single parliamentary seat.
We examine our arguments in the lawsuits between commercial banks and their defaulting
borrowers in the Kerala High Court.
3.2 Status-Based Evaluation of Integrity Claims: Whose Burden
is it to Prove?
The disproportionate advantages enjoyed by high-status firms in markets is well docu-
mented. High-status firms are often sought-after partners in market exchanges (Podolny
(1994); Chung et al. (2000); Thye (2000); Baum et al. (2005); (n.d.); (Jensen, (2008))). High-
status others gravitate towards them due to status homophily consideration (Podolny (1994);
Benjamin & Podolny (1999) ; Chung et al. (2000)), and low-status others aspire to partner
with them to enhance their own social standing via association (Podolny (1993); Kilduff
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& Krackhardt (1994); Benjamin & Podolny (1999); Gulati & Higgins (2003)). Because of
status homophily, highstatus firms can retain their position even if there are occasional dips
in their performance (Podolny (1993); Phillips & Zuckerman (2001)). Due to the higher
expected value that they add to any relationship, they can make their low-status exchange
partners work harder for them (Thye (2000); Castellucci & Ertug (2010)). High-status firms
can also charge a premium for their offerings (Benjamin & Podolny (1999)), get high-quality
supplies (Podolny (1993); Benjamin & Podolny (1999)), and even high-quality labor at deep
discounts (Frank (1985); Bidwell et al. (2015)).
Usually, these disproportionate rewards accrue to high-status firms due to the uncer-
tainty the audience faces in evaluating firms’ quality claims (Podolny (2001)). This type of
uncertainty is generally referred to as altercentric uncertainty because it is a firm’s alters
that face uncertainty in evaluating its quality (Podolny & Castellucci (1999)). A central
tenet of extant status theory is that the audience resolves altercentric uncertainty using
status as a simplifying heuristic to evaluate firms’ quality. The audience equates higher
status to higher quality. It is usually a reasonable expectation because the status of a firm is
the deference that it enjoys from other market participants (Gould (2002)), who tend to
sort towards high-quality producers and sort away from unreliable ones (Podolny (1993);
Phillips et al. (2013)). But studies also show that high-status producers reap these benefits
of doubt emerging from altercentric uncertainty even when they are evaluated on integrity.
Although quality is the primary consideration that the audience uses when evaluating
a producer, at least some care about its integrity (Jensen, (2008); Krishnan & Kozhikode
(2015)). But the integrity of high-status actors cannot be taken for granted ( Jensen, (2008);
Jonsson et al. (2009); Greve et al. (2010); Krishnan & Kozhikode (2015)). For instance,
high-status firms have been shown to use questionable means to deliver quality and even
engage in outright illegality (Perrow (1961); Jensen, (2008); Greve et al. (2010); Krishnan
& Kozhikode (2015)). Yet, high-status actors usually get away with allegations of integrity
violations due to the status halo (Benoit-Smullyan (1944); Polman et al. (2013)). That is,
even though status only signals quality, the audience often uses it to evaluate integrity.
The audience conflates high status with both high quality and high integrity (Krishnan &
Kozhikode (2015); McDonnell & King (2018)), at least until a high-status actor unambigu-
ously breaches that expectation, or when its integrity violations become public (Schudson
(2004); Adut (2005)). In this sense, high-status firms are considered innocent until proven
otherwise – they are freed of the burden of proof, which rests with their audience. Con-
sequently, high-status firms can even get favorable verdicts in the court of law for their
transgressions (McDonnell & King (2018)). Thus, it is evident from extant status research
that the odds in the market and even non-market arenas are unduly stacked in favor of
high-status producers, irrespective of how they attained their status or how they retain it.
An implicit consequence of such status-based evaluations by the audience is that it can
breed inequality and questionable morality in markets and beyond (Ridgeway (2014)). First,
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the disproportionate opportunities afforded to high-status actors make competition in the
market uneven, leaving a wide gap between the haves and have-nots of the market. An
outcome that is widely known as the Matthew effect of accumulated advantages (Merton
(1968)). Due to their ability to get away with questionable means to deliver quality, high-
status actors also hamper the morality of markets, as other firms may imitate the elite
(DiMaggio & Powell (1983); Bauman et al. (2016)). In this paper, we argue that while the
Matthew effect may be considered a fair game under free-market capitalism, it may not
be generalizable to other markets where status aspirations are derided due to substantial
leveling pressures.
As an economic system, free-market capitalism is built on the principles that the market
is a level playing field where the property rights of producers are guaranteed by the law,
labor participation is voluntary and sans discrimination, and an efficient price mechanism
ensures that consumers get what they paid for (Smith (1937); Hayek (2020); Friedman
(1962)). A free market is expected to not just enhance the wealth of a society (Smith (1937))
but also breed morality in it (De Montesquieu et al. (1900)). For (Smith (1937)), while
capitalism facilitates the accumulation of wealth for the capitalists, it also makes the others
associated with the capitalist modes of production better off. (De Montesquieu et al. (1900)),
who served as an intellectual inspiration for the framers of the US constitution, believed
that markets eradicate a society’s prejudices because commerce only thrives when market
participants exhibit higher moral standards. In this tradition, any inequality in a capitalist
system is expected to be a well-earned reward that accrues to the able and righteous
capitalists for the risks they take in the market.
This is a reasonable expectation in an ideal market society where opportunities are
evenly distributed, and the competent producers get to the top of the status hierarchy
by consistently delivering high-quality offerings and acting with integrity (Weber (1905);
McClelland (1985); Bodkin (2001)). But we know from a large body of research that even
in free markets, the audience faces difficulty measuring quality (Podolny (2001)), and
producers do use questionable means to deliver quality (Mishina et al. (2010)). So, the
status may or may not signal quality and integrity. Due to the free market’s promise as a
level playing field, all things remaining the same, the audience in market societies expects
that high-status producers occupy their coveted position through fair means. Hence, it
passes on its benefits of the doubt to them until their quality claims and integrity claims
are refuted beyond doubt (Edelman et al. (2011); McDonnell & King (2018)). This is our
point of departure from prior status research.
It is premature to expect that audiences outside of the market society will hold the
same baseline evaluation about high-status producers. For instance, several societies the
world over subscribe to one of the long-standing and most substantial criticisms of free-
market capitalism, that it concentrates power in a society in the hands of a selective few
capitalists who unduly profit from exploiting the weaker sections of the society (Marx
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(2004)). Critiques of freemarket capitalism call for varying degrees of state intervention
as the remedy. For the Marxists, the solution lies in a full-blown communist state - the
dictatorship of the proletariat – that establishes a redistributive economy, where there
is no room for a free market or free enterprise. When a communist state is established,
the wealth of the capitalists is confiscated and redistributed by the state to the rest of
the society. Although several of these communist states have disbanded or deemphasized
communist ideals and are now more open to some form of capitalism, the state still plays a
significant role in these post-communist and transitionary societies, and their communist
legacy continues to shape the markets (Marquis & Qiao (2020)).
Aside from full-blown communist regimes, several countries the world over have em-
braced some form of redistributive socialism. Not all opponents of free-market capitalism
embrace the Marxist view of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Instead, they seek to curb
the perils of free-market capitalism through varying degrees of state intervention. Hence,
a variety of capitalism now exists that is some combination of free-market principles and
some level of state intervention (Hall and Sockice, 2001; Greif, 2005). Market participants
in these settings are subjected to significant leveling pressures that are institutionalized by
redistributive policies (Dutton, 2002; Samuel and Hadjar, 2016).
One of the cornerstones of these leveling pressures is that status aspirations are dis-
approved. High-status producers are often portrayed as the cause for all the society’s ills.
While Marxist critics focus on the exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalists (Vidal
(2019)), other critics focus on the unbridled pursuit of profits of capitalists that come at
the cost of social good (Glasbeek et al. (2005)). Rapid erosion of natural resources, degra-
dation of the environment, rampant corruption, and ever-increasing inequality have all
been attributed to the greed of the few elite corporations (Glasbeek et al. (2005); Vidal
(2019)). In fact, such leveling pressures have been witnessed within the fringes of the
free markets, in ethnic enclaves (Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993)), workers and producers
cooperatives (Ingram & Simons (2000); Simons & Ingram (2003)), and even urban ghettos
(Venkatesh (1997)). While the state in these favors the free market, producers and workers
who are disadvantaged in these regimes’ mainstream markets gravitate to the fringes of the
mainstream and seek to establish an egalitarian market that relies on bounded solidarity
and enforceable trust (Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993)).
In this paper, we argue that unlike their counterparts in market societies, the audience
in socialist societies may not place high-status producers at a high pedestal, especially when
evaluating their integrity. We theorize that the audience is skeptical about the integrity
claims of high-status firms in socialist settings. Consequently, we propose that high-status
firms would be at a relative disadvantage in socialist societies when they are assessed on
their integrity. But high-status firms may be able to gain a favorable assessment if they
can present ample evidence of their goodness that contradicts their audience’s baseline
expectations. That is, the burden of proof for their integrity will lie squarely in the hands
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of the high-status firms. Below we present our research context and develop testable
hypotheses
3.3 Democratic Socialism in Kerala and the Burden of Status of
Commercial Banks
The Indian state of Kerala has attracted much attention from sociologists (Desai (2002);
Gibson (2012)), development economists (Deshpande (2000); Jensen (2007)), and political
scientists (Overstreet & Windmiller (1959); Robin (1992)) for its unique socio-economic
development model which has successfully transformed the region from one that was highly
stratified and unequal to one that is democratic, socialist, and egalitarian (Robin (1992)).
Kerala’s socioeconomic development is way ahead of the rest of India and is comparable
to the developed world (Isaac & Kumar (1991); Deshpande (2000)). Renowned political
historian Robin Jeffery (1992) noted the transformation of Kerala as follows: “Nothing more
vividly illustrates the transformation of Kerala in the twentieth century than the way people
use their hands. In the old Kerala that began to dissolve rapidly in the 1920s, a low-caste
man put ‘his left hand on his breast, and his right over his mouth,’ if he dared to speak
to his superiors, ‘for fear his breath may pollute the air.’ By the 1950s, however, it was
more likely that men – and increasingly women too – would use their hands differently, as
clenched fists, shaken above their heads, as they chanted ‘Inquilab Zindabad’ (victory to
revolution) and marched in demonstrations.” While various reasons have contributed to
Kerala’s transformation, the state’s long history with Marxist mobilization of peasants and
workers has been critical (Isaac & Kumar (1991); Robin (1992)).
The emergence of communism in Kerala can be traced back to the early 1920s when the
region witnessed a significant mobilization of peasants and workers in the independence
movement spearheaded by the Indian National Congress (INC). But slowly, the communists
took over the INC in Kerala. They facilitated the formation of several trade unions in the
textile industry, which was the backbone of commerce in Kerala before independence. A
rift with the INC elites prompted Kerala’s communists to organize outside the congress
label in their unencumbered pursuit of Marxism rejected by the INC. The communists who
left the INC joined the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1939.
While the CPI’s mobilization was heavily curtailed during the British rule, the CPI
continued its grassroots mobilization in Kerala, which bore fruit after Indian independence.
The CPI won the first-ever election held for the state of Kerala in 1957. In 1964, a large
splinter group of the CPI left the party due to ideological disagreements. This resulted in
the formation of a new political party, the Communist Party of India – Marxist (CPIM). In
Kerala, the CPIM and its allies – the Left Democratic Front (LDF), won their first assembly
election in 1967. The LDF has held power in the Kerala assembly for roughly half the period
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since then. The INC and its allies, the United Democratic Front (UDF), have held power for
the remaining half.
But due to electoral compulsions (Downs et al. (1957)), the communist governments
in Kerala took a more moderate approach to public policy rather than the radical reforms
witnessed in other communist dictatorships such as China and USSR (Nossiter (1982)).
Although the UDF is generally considered more business-friendly than the LDF, due to
electoral compulsions, its policy prescriptions are not drastically different from those of
the LDF, and it is deemed as a center-left coalition. Due to the widespread acceptance of
democratic socialism in the state, India’s dominant right-wing political party, the Bhartiya
Janata Party (BJP), and its allies have not made any notable progress in Kerala even now.
One of the significant policy changes brought in by the communists in Kerala was a
land reform act that effectively abolished feudalism by redistributing land to the tiller
from the wealthy landlords. The first attempt to implement the reform came in 1959, right
after the CPI came to power in Kerala for the first time, but it faced stiff resistance from
landlords, who successfully contested it in the Kerala High Court. It took another decade
before the CPIM could reintroduce the bill and get it passed in the state legislature with
bipartisan support. In fact, while the land reform bill or the “land for the tiller” bill was
implemented by the communist parties, the bill very closely followed the recommendations
of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee’s Report of 1949, which the INC failed to
enact into law. The law mandated that no family shall own more than 15 acres of tillable
land and forced landlords to part away with the excess land to the tillers who have been
renting it until then. Within a decade of the law’s enactment, over two million tillable land
plots were redistributed from wealthy landlords to the tillers who were renting it from
them until then (Herring (1980)).
While socialism in Kerala ended feudalism in agriculture, it also paved the way for
an egalitarian marketplace. The state has strived to promote small enterprises and en-
trepreneurship among underrepresented sections of society (Mars (1975)). The government
of Kerala has set up several cooperative banks and non-banking financial institutions to lend
to aspiring entrepreneurs without collateral (Davy (2004); Gopakumar (2005)). Similarly,
the state promotes business ventures by women self-help groups and tribal communities by
offering them easy access to micro-credit and setting up direct to consumer marketplaces
that help these small businesses avoid the middlemen (Pat (2005); Devika & Thampi (2007);
Arun et al. (2011); Biju & Kumar (2013)). At the same time, high-status corporations are
often blamed for most social ills, and they are often sites of a variety of protests, demon-
strations, and lawsuits. Over the years, business units of India’s renowned business groups
such as the Birlas and the Adanis, and those of world-renowned multinational corporations
such as Coke and Pepsi all have been targeted by the trade unions, consumer groups,
environmental activists, and even the government of Kerala with allegations of corporate
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greed and malfeasance (Mohan & Raman (1988); Bijoy (2006); [Surendran, 2006]; [New
Indian Express, 2018]; [Hindustan Times, 2020]).
Kerala’s democratic socialism, which holds high-status corporations in distrust, offers
an appealing contrast to the benefit of doubt enjoyed by high-status corporations in free-
market capitalism. This contrast is nowhere more visible in the banking industry than in
any other industry. Commercial banks have often been considered the flag bearers of free-
market capitalism (Simons & Ingram (1997)), but they are vehicles of redistributive policies
in a socialist economy (Caprio Jr & Levine (1994)). Commercial banks in socialist regimes
have often considered social enterprises rather than commercial enterprises. Socialist
governments often mandate commercial banks to lend to sectors that help them deliver their
socialist objectives rather than those catering to banks’ commercial interests. Consequently,
commercial banks in socialist regimes seldom care about their borrowers’ creditworthiness
or prioritize debt collection (Krishnan & Kozhikode (2015)). They could afford it because
the state assumed the risk of default and covered banks’ losses (Caprio Jr & Levine (1994)).
But commercial banks in India were mainly in private hands until Indian independence,
and they enjoyed the freedom to pursue their commercial interests under the British. They
continue to enjoy this freedom during the Nehru Era. But in the late 1960s, the communists
pressured the new prime minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, to nationalize prominent commercial
banks in India to deliver credit to rural India, which was virtually unbanked until then
(Sen (2017)). In response, India nationalized 20 commercial banks, bringing close to 80%
of the banking industry under government ownership and control (Bhasin (2007)). The
government also set rural lending targets for private banks. For instance, for each branch
that a private bank opened in an urban center, it was expected to open four more in
unbanked rural areas (Kozhikode (2016)). This status quo remained until the introduction
of economic liberalization in the early 1990s. The banking industry served the interests of
the communist governments until then, but India’s economic liberalization in the 1990s
changed that (Bhasin (2007)).
First, the Reserve Bank of India issued licenses to form several new private banks and
facilitated several foreign banks to establish their branches in India (Kumbhakar & Sarkar
(2003)). The banking industry became highly competitive with the entry of these new
players. Although the Indian banking industry did not have a reliable system to assess
borrowers’ credit history, banks competed fiercely for loans by offering lucrative rates not
seen before in India. Further, despite deregulation in the banking industry, banks were
still required to meet the government’s lending targets to priority sectors– e.g., agriculture,
education, housing, infrastructure, etc. But one thing that changed with liberalization was
that banks were now held accountable for accumulating bad debts (Krishnan & Kozhikode
(2015)).
In 2004, the Reserve Bank of India mandated commercial banks to periodically disclose
NPA levels in their loan portfolios. The new regulatory requirement soon started having
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an impact on how banks in India were evaluated. Banks came under tremendous pressure
from their shareholders to improve their asset quality. Banks with healthy NPA ratios won
accolades from the popular press and were rewarded by the RBI. So, maintaining a good
reputation for asset quality became a highly desired goal for Indian banks. To facilitate
banks in their loan recovery effort, the government of India headed by the BJP enacted
the “Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities
Interest Act” in 2002 (SARFAESI Act). It allowed banks significant leeway to recover unpaid
loans from wilful defaulters. But banks also used it to harass defaulters who had genuine
financial difficulties, like farmers after a failed harvest or small businesses unable to repay
the loans due to seasonal fluctuations in demand (Krishnan & Kozhikode (2015)). Many of
these borrowers committed suicides due to the harassment of banks (Jeromi (2007)).
In Kerala, consumer groups called it a draconian law that unduly favored elite com-
mercial banks and undermined the common man’s interest (Ameerudheen (2018); Cris
(2019)). They have routinely protested and demanded that the central government repeal
it or revise it to reduce its detrimental impact on the weak (News-Minute (2018)). The
LDF in Kerala supported these protests and urged the commercial banks to go lenient
on borrowers from the weaker section, and it urged the central government to relax the
law, at least for the weaker sections of the society (Hindu (2019)). But commercial banks
were unwilling to concede as they had immense pressure from their shareholders, the
RBI, analysts, and popular press to bring their NPA under control (Businessline (2019)).
The central government was not forthcoming to amend the SARFAESI Act as the banking
industry was in bad shape (Manju (2019)).
Consequently, in a last-ditch attempt to resist banks’ recovery attempts, many defaulting
borrowers approached the courts. But the courts have minimal sway in these cases as the
SARFAESI Act affords banks substantial leeway to repossess troubled assets without seeking
the court’s permission (Siraj & Pillai (2012)). Despite this, the Kerala High Court, our study
setting, received about two thousand cases during our study period, over a third of all
such cases received by all high courts across India. Below, we theorize how a commercial
bank’s status may matter in court rulings in debt recovery lawsuits between banks and
their borrowers in the Kerala High Court under the SARFESI act.
3.4 Hypothesis Development
3.4.1 The Burden of High Status in Socialist Courtrooms
Our central criticism of prior status research pertains to the universality of its assumption
about the audience’s biased positive evaluation of high-status actors’ integrity claims.
According to prior status research, which is predominantly based on evidence from market
societies, the audience place high-status producers at a high pedestal because they assume
the market is a level playing field where status is attained through fair practices due to free
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and fair competition and an effective rule of law which weeds out dishonest actors and
curtails unfair acts (Hahl & Zuckerman (2014); McDonnell & King (2018)). But as we have
contended so far, in socialist societies, audiences consider markets to be loaded in favor
of the high-status actors who act in self-interested ways unless they are disciplined by the
state and civil society.
At first blush, it may appear that these differences in status-based evaluations may not
have a bearing on how courts decide firms’ culpability. But courts are not often as objective
as they are widely conceived (Stepanov (2010)). Research in the sociology of law shows
that courtrooms are influenced by public opinion and prevalent biases and stereotypes
in a society (Edelman et al. (2011); Lemmings (2016); McDonnell & King (2018)). When
culpability is difficult to establish, jurors and judges rely on their intuition and other
simplifying heuristics prevalent in a society to determine an actor’s culpability (Guthrie
et al. (2009); Peer & Gamliel (2013)). For instance, gender and racial stereotypes and first
impressions have been shown to influence US courts’ judgments (Rachlinski et al. (2008);
Nadler & McDonnell (2011)). Judges and juries even use seemingly objective evidence
presented to them in a manner that confirms their heuristics and intuition (Englich et al.
(2006)). Similar biases exist even in cases that involve corporations. For instance, (Edelman
et al. (2011)) observed that in discrimination lawsuits, judges in the US used the presence
of employee grievance departments in firms as evidence of the innocence of those firms.
These heuristics have been shown to be loaded in favor of high-status actors in capi-
talistic settings. For instance, (Edelman et al. (2011)) observed that plaintiffs who lacked
significant clout disproportionately lost discrimination lawsuits. Similarly, (McDonnell &
King (2018)) showed how courts in the US generally ruled in favor of high-status firms in
employment discrimination lawsuits, as they expect high-status firms to act with higher
integrity than their low-status counterparts. We expect that such status-based biases may
also operate in the courtrooms in socialist settings, but the heuristics and intuitions will
be in alignment with the negative expectations held against high-status firms in these
societies. Whereas courts in capitalist settings expect high-status actors to be innocent until
proven otherwise, we expect that courts in socialist settings may expect high-status actors
to be guilty until proven otherwise. Hence, we predict that in lawsuits filed by defaulting
borrowers against their banks challenging their debt recovery practices, the higher the
bank’s status, the more likely it is that the court will rule against the bank and in favor of
the aggrieved borrower.
Hypothesis 1: In socialist settings, the higher the status of a commercial bank in a debt
recovery lawsuit filed against it by its defaulting borrower, the higher the likelihood that the court
will rule against it.
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3.4.2 Heterogeneity in Courtroom Biases
Our prediction that high status is a burden in courtrooms of socialist democracies is built
on the premise that courtrooms in these settings consider the market to be loaded in favor
of the high status actors, and they seek to discipline their behavior. We now tease out
this mechanism by exploring two sources of heterogeneity in courtroom biases against
high-status firms in socialist settings. First, we examine the heterogeneity in audience
perception. We expect that even within a socialist setting, some regimes may be more left-
leaning than others, which may have a bearing on courtroom biases. Second, we examine
the heterogeneity in the evidence for the integrity of the defendant firms. We expect that
at least some firms that are being sued in courts will have accumulated ample evidence
to disprove their audience’s baseline expectation. When a high-status firm can show that
they have a history of high integrity that defies their socialist audience’s expectations, they
may get a favorable verdict in courts. Below we develop these ideas further into moderating
hypotheses.
Strength of the left-wing and reinforcement of courtroom biases. The biases audience
holds against high-status firms in democratic socialist settings may be reinforced or weak-
ened depending upon the power of the socialist ideology in that setting. Due to democracy,
there could be considerable temporal heterogeneity in the ideology endorsed within the
society (Downs et al. (1957)). Audience preference for socialist policies may ebb and flow.
Such heterogeneity in preferences could permeate into the courtroom as well (Nagel (1961)).
This can happen both organically as a reflection of the voters’ shifting preferences, or it can
occur due to the state’s intervention (Zuk et al. (1993); Segal et al. (1995)).
Courtrooms have been shown to sway towards public opinion. What courts deem as
normative and commendable and what they denigrate as counter normative and punishable
is determined to a great extent by public opinion (Mishler & Sheehan (1993)). When a
leftleaning party is in power, it reflects the public’s preference for leftist ideology, which
views high-status corporations as the cause for social ills. Hence, when a communist
government is in power, the courtrooms may deliver verdicts that are less favorable to
high-status organizations.
But courtrooms can also become disproportionately loaded in favor of the ideology
endorsed by the party in power through the active intervention of the ruling party (Mishler
& Sheehan (1993); Zuk et al. (1993); Segal et al. (1995)). Parties in power can appoint
like-minded judges to vacant positions in the courtrooms and thereby extract rulings
that support their ideology. For instance, judges of the US Supreme Court appointed by
Republican presidents of the US tend to rule more conservatively than their colleagues
appointed by Democratic presidents (Zuk et al. (1993); Segal et al. (1995)). So, when a
communist party is in power, the judges tend to be more left-leaning in nature and tend to
be even more biased against high-status corporations. Hence, we hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 2: In socialist settings, any negative effect of the status of a commercial bank on
the verdict it receives in debt recovery lawsuits filed against it by its defaulting borrower will be
stronger when the government is ruled by a left-leaning party.
Proof of integrity and the reversal of courtroom biases. The biases audience holds
against high-status firms in democratic socialist settings may be reinforced or weakened
depending upon the evidence of integrity that these firms bring to bear. The audience uses a
firm’s status to set behavioral expectations. We had argued so far that whereas in a capitalist
setting, audiences expect high-status firms to exhibit high integrity, in socialist settings, the
audience expects the opposite. This low integrity expectation from high-status firms is what
drives courtrooms to rule against them in lawsuits filed against them by their aggrieved
customers. But a high-status firm can persuade its audience to revise its expectation by
presenting evidence to the contrary.
Firms can signal their integrity to their audience by engaging in socially responsible
behavior (Krishnan & Kozhikode (2015)). Prior research has shown that firms in the US
reduced their litigation risks by engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Koh et al.
(2014)). We expect that the audience of high CSR firms may feel compelled to evaluate a
firm in a positive light due to the proof of integrity that its CSR activities present. CSR
initiatives may help a high-status firm in socialist courtrooms by revising the lower integrity
expectations held against them by the judges.
But firms must go beyond the call of duty and not merely engage in symbolic compliance
to CSR mandates in socialist settings. Most socialist settings require firms to engage in some
form of CSR. For instance, commercial banks in India are expected to increase their lending
to priority sectors such as agriculture and education. These areas may not be lucrative
for the banks, but it helps the government push its development agenda. But merely
meeting the state’s mandate for priority sector lending would not suffice. They may have to
engage in more priority sector lending than their competitors. Hence, only increasing their
commitment to corporate social responsibility will help them reverse the negative integrity
expectations that the audience holds about them. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: In socialist settings, any negative effect of the status of a commercial bank on
the verdict it receives in debt recovery lawsuits filed against it by its defaulting borrower will be
weaker for banks that exhibit a higher commitment to corporate social responsibility.
3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Data and Dependent Variable
We examined the influence of commercial banks’ status on the verdicts they received in
debt recovery lawsuits filed in the High Court of Kerala from 2003 to 2015. We started
our observation in 2003 because the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) was implemented in
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December 2002. The SARFAESI Act allowed commercial banks and other financial institu-
tions to recover bad loans from defaulting borrowers by repossessing and auctioning their
residential or commercial properties. Banks have routinely used this act to recover bad
loans since then, but it has also faced stiff resistance from consumers who have challenged
the methods adopted by the banks in courts. For our study, we were interested in cases filed
in the Kerala High Court.
We obtained data on debt recovery lawsuits filed in the Kerala High Court from
https://indiankanoon.org/, an online repository of cases filed in Indian courts. We used a
web scraping program to download all cases filed in the Kerala High Court that involved
a commercial bank in India from 2003 to 2015. We manually identified debt recovery
lawsuits between banks and their individual borrowers filed under the SARFESI Act from
this initial list. The first debt recovery case adjudicated under the SARFAESI Act by the
Kerala High Court was in 2006. There were only five cases that year, but the number of
adjudicated cases has progressively increased since then, peaking at 400 cases in 2010. The
last case we observed in our dataset was adjudicated in September 2015. We identified a
total of 2013 such lawsuits from 2006 to 2015, where an outcome was determined.
In each debt recovery case, we identified if the bank won or lost the case by reading the
case texts. The dependent variable we use in this study is a binary outcome of zeros and
ones based on the known outcomes. Specifically, we coded the dependent variable as a one
if the realized outcome favored the banks and as zero otherwise. Of these binary-coded
outcomes involving the debt recovery cases, a total of 1858 (i.e., 92.3%) favored the banks,
and 155 (i.e., 7.70%) favored the borrower. This suggests that debt recovery lawsuits are
predominantly ruled in favor of banks, as originally intended by the Government of India.
Debt recovery lawsuits in the Kerala High Court thus offers a conservative setting to test our
hypotheses of biases against high-status banks in socialist courtrooms. If banks invariably
win cases, as the numbers indicate, the prejudice against high-status banks has to be severe
in the Kerala High Court for us to pick up a statistically significant effect.
Of the total 2013 litigated cases, 723 cases were held between the period 2006 and 2010
(i.e. LDF era) and the rest of the 1290 cases were ligitgated between 2011 to 2015 (UDF
era). In terms of the banks loss rate, 14.1% was recorded during the LDF era (i.e. 102 losses
vs 621 wins) and improved 4.1% during the UDF era (i.e. 53 losses vs 1237 wins). It is
worthwhile to note that even though the number of cases increased almost doubled during
the UDF era, the number of losses almost halved. This is a further indication of the strength
of the political influence hypothesis (i.e. hypothesis-2) espoused in this paper. Table C.2
gives a detailed breakdown of the cases per year.
3.5.2 Independent Variables and Moderators
Status signifies how central and influential a bank is relative to its peers. Bonacich centrality
score is a widely used measure of status (Podolny & Phillips (1996); Podolny (2001)). It is the
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network centrality score of an actor that considers the actor’s centrality and the centrality
of those connected with it (Bonacich (1987)). We used the list of preferred bankers of all
firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange to construct a network of all commercial banks.
Several firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange list their preferred bankers in their
annual reports. As it is a voluntary disclosure, it signals a corporation’s endorsement of the
banks that it lists as preferred bankers.
Several firms list more than one bank as preferred bankers. Preferred bankers often
share banking responsibilities, such as co-lending on commercial loans to the firm and
jointly promoting its share and debenture issues. Thus, banks intersect with each other
when they jointly service a corporate client that lists them as “preferred.” This approach
to constructing networks of banks through their joint affiliations with corporate clients is
consistent with the methods of prior research on social networks, in which networks of
venture capitalists have been constructed using their affiliations with start-up firms that
they jointly funded (e.g., Sorenson & Stuart (2001); Rider (2009)). Based on this network,
we computed each bank’s Bonacich centrality score each year and used this as the measure
of Bank status.
Hypothesis 2 predicts the moderating role of the ruling party’s political ideology in
Kerala during the adjudication. We expected that any negative effect of a bank’s status on its
debt recovery lawsuits will be strengthened when a left-leaning party is in power. During
our study period, two major coalitions have held the state government in Kerala- The
Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). The LDF comprises
the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Communist Party of India, and several other
smaller left-leaning parties. The UDF consists of the Indian National Congress (Indira),
the All-India Muslim League, and several other smaller parties. Between these two major
coalitions, the LDF, as its name suggests, is more left-leaning, whereas the UDF is usually
classified as a centrist or center-left coalition by most political observers (Ibrahim (2009);
Sáez & Sinha (2010)). The LDF was in power from 2006 to 2010. So, we coded Communist
in Power as 1 between 2006 and 2010 and as 0 between 2011 and 2015.
Hypothesis 3 predicts the moderating role of a bank’s corporate social responsibility
during the adjudication. A bank’s commitment to lend to the needy who do not have
reliable credit records is an act of corporate social responsibility. The Government of
India recognizes specific sectors such as education and agriculture as priority sectors and
mandates banks to lend a portion of their assets to priority sectors. As lending to priority
sectors carries significant default risks, there is considerable heterogeneity among banks
in the willingness to lend to these sectors. While most just comply, some go beyond the
mandate and lend extensively, and some others underperform on the mandate and choose
to pay a fine instead (Uppal (2009); Kumar et al. (2016)). Therefore, we coded Socially




First, we controlled for several bank-level variables that account for alternative explanations
for our effect of status. While some of these alternative explanations relate to known
correlates of status that may influence the verdict, others are specific to our setting. High-
status banks are also likely to be bigger in size, so we must rule out the possibility that
the effect of status that we observe is not driven by size. So, we controlled for Bank Size
measured as the number of workers (in thousands) employed by the bank during the
previous year. Banks that perform well may attract guilty verdict in a socialist courtroom,
but high-status banks may also perform better than the average. So, we controlled for Bank
Performance, measured as the return on assets in the previous year. Like performance, the
quality of a bank’s assets may be closely related to status. When it visibly slips, even a
high-status bank may engage in questionable actions, increasing its chances of being ruled
guilty in debt recovery lawsuits. So, we controlled for a Bank’s asset quality, measured as the
ratio of non-performing assets in the bank’s loan portfolio.
High-status banks may also be more likely to get listed in the stock exchange, but they
also face intense pressure from shareholders to recover their bad debts, which might have
contributed to questionable recovery practices that attract a guilty verdict in the courtroom.
So, we controlled for Listed Banks measured as 1 if the bank was listed in any Indian stock
exchange and 0 otherwise. High-status banks can afford expensive lawyers who may help
them win cases, so we controlled for a Bank’s Legal Expenses as the amount (in millions
of rupees) that a bank spent on legal expenses the previous year. High-status banks may
get into the good books of the courts through advertisements. So, we controlled for the
Bank’s Advertisement Expenses as the amount (in millions of rupees) that a bank spent on
advertising and publicity the previous year. We also controlled for ownership of banks, as
several State-Owned Banks have come to occupy high status over the years, but they may get
a favorable verdict because of the support they enjoy from the government.
Next, we controlled for several case-level variables that may influence the verdict and
mask the status effect. To begin with, it is crucial to consider the bank’s record in similar
lawsuits. Some banks may have figured out a way to win similar cases and cite those as
precedence for future cases. So, we controlled for the Bank’s Win Rate as the proportion of
SARFAESI cases won by it in the Kerala High Court until the focal case was adjudicated.
Parties to a lawsuit may also cite multiple previous lawsuits to claim precedence. When
there is substantial precedence, it may negate the effect of other biases. So, we controlled
for the Number of Cases Cited in each case. While the SARFAESI is the primary act cited in
these lawsuits, other acts are routinely cited, such as several sections of the Indian Penal
Code that the bank may have violated. We expect that when there are additional grounds
to find a party guilty, it may influence the verdict. So, we controlled for the Number of Acts
Cited in each case.
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3.5.4 Model Specification
As we have a binary outcome, we used a logit model to assess the independent variables’
effect on verdicts in debt recovery lawsuits. To rule out endogeneity concerns, we also ran
an instrumental variable probit estimate to examine the main effect of status. As there are
multiple cases per bank, we had to account for the non-independence of cases involving
the same bank. So, in all our models, we report standard errors robust to bank-level
heteroskedasticity.
3.6 Results
Table C.1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of all the study variables. Some
of our covariates exhibited high intercorrelation, so there was a risk of multicollinearity.
To overcome this concern, we tested our hypothesized effects hierarchically. We also mean-
centered all continuous variables used to construct interaction terms. The mean-variance
inflation factor was under 4 in all models, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem
in this study. In Table 3.1, we report the results of our main logit specification. In this table,
Model 1 is the baseline with all the controls, Model 2 tests the main effect of Bank status,
Model 3 tests hypotheses 2 pertaining to the interaction betweenBank status and Communist
in power, Model 4 tests hypotheses 3 related to the interaction between Bank status and its
Socially responsible lending, Model 5 is the full model with all the controls and theoretical
variables.
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Table 3.1: Logit Estimates for Outcome of Debt Recovery Lawsuits Favoring Banks
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Bank Size -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Bank Performance -80.50** -85.18** -73.45** -90.36*** -78.57**
(30.83) (27.66) (27.78) (24.36) (25.24)
Bank’s Asset Quality -19.82* -24.74** -22.16* -25.02** -21.83*
(9.27) (9.53) (9.63) (9.43) (9.63)
Listed Banks -0.32 -0.28 -0.15 -0.14 0.06
(0.46) (0.52) (0.49) (0.37) (0.31)
Bank’s Legal Expenses -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank’s Advertisement Expenses 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State-Owned Banks 0.12 0.28 0.39* 0.21 0.32
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Bank’s Win Rate 1.89*** 1.89*** 1.93*** 1.84*** 1.87***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Number of Case Cited -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of Acts Cited 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Communist in Power -0.87*** -0.83*** -0.38 -0.88*** -0.34
(0.26) (0.21) (0.31) (0.22) (0.30)
Socially Responsible Lending 4.33** 5.25*** 4.26** 4.65*** 3.19*
(1.42) (1.52) (1.48) (1.35) (1.33)
Bank Status -0.20* -0.02 -1.02* -1.22**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.41) (0.43)
Bank Status -0.35* -0.44***
X Communist in Power (0.15) (0.13)
Bank Status 2.56* 3.91**
X Socially Responsible Lending (1.18) (1.32)
Constant 1.25** 1.20** 0.90* 1.33** 1.03*
(0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Chi Square 347.795 282.797 533.036 355.125 1001.054
Log Likelihood -484 -482 -481 -482 -479
N = 2013 lawsuits involving 58 commercial banks.
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
Observations clustered by bank to account for non-independence
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)
In Model 1, some of our controls are significant. Bigger banks, banks that performed
well, and banks with low asset quality experienced a decreased probability of winning a
debt recovery lawsuit in the Kerala High Court. Banks that had a history of winning, banks
that advertised intensively, and those that spent more on corporate social responsibility
experienced an increased probability of winning a debt recovery lawsuit in the Kerala High
Court. Banks lost more cases during the communist regime and when there was greater
legal precedence.
Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative relationship between Bank status and Bank favored
outcome -i.e., we expected that high-status banks will have a higher probability of losing
cases than their lower-status counterparts. Model 2 in Tables 2 confirms this hypothesis.
The coefficient for Bank status is negative and significant (=-0.205, SE=0.086, p=0.017).
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These findings have high practical significance too. A one-unit increase in a bank’s status
decreased its odds (1-exp[-0.205]) of winning the debt recovery lawsuit in Kerala by 19%.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the negative effect of Bank status on Bank favored outcome
will be strengthened by the Communist in power. As expected, the interaction term in Model
3 in Table 3.1 is negative and significant (=-0.351, SE=0.154, p=0.023). Thus, Hypothesis
2 is supported. Figure 1 shows the marginal effects of this interaction based on the full
model’s coefficients. When the LDF government was in power (i.e., Communist in power=1),
a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s status (1.08) decreased its odds of winning
a favorable verdict in the Kerala High Court by 19.5 percentage points, but a comparable
increase in status when the UDF government was in power (i.e., Communist in power=0),
decreased its odds of winning the case only by 12.8 percentage points, a net difference of
6.7 percentage points. When a left-leaning party was in power, a highstatus bank increased
its odds of getting an unfavorable verdict by 6.7 percentage points or 52 percentages than a
peer that was one standard deviation below it in status.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the negative effect of Bank status on Bank favored outcome
will be weakened by the bank’s Socially responsible lending. As expected, the interaction
term in Model 4 in Table 3.1 is positive and significant (=2.562, SE=1.182, p=0.030). Thus,
Hypothesis 3 is supported. In Figure 2, we plot the marginal effects of this interaction
based on the full model’s coefficients. When a bank’s Socially responsible lending is at its
mean value (0.3), a one standard deviation increase in its status (1.08) decreases its odds
of winning a favorable verdict in the Kerala High Court by 15.1 percentage points. But a
comparable rise in a bank’s status when its Socially responsible lending is one standard
deviation above the mean (0.4) decreases its odds of winning a favorable verdict by 12.8
percentage points. That is, by increasing its socially responsible lending by one standard
deviation, a high-status bank can decrease its odds of getting an unfavorable verdict by
2.3 percentage points or by 15.1 percentages than its peers that is one standard deviation
below it in status.
Model 5 in Table 3.1 includes the comprehensive model testing both the interactions.
All relationships from the earlier models continue to be supported in the full model. Thus,
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are fully supported.
3.6.1 Additional Analysis
Alternative specification. We wanted to examine if our results are robust to alternative
specifications. Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE) are widely used in panel data
analysis because it can produce an unbiased estimation of population-averaged regression
coefficients even if the correlation structure is misspecified (Ghisletta & Spini (2004)).
Another advantage of GEE is that it allows us to estimate the models using the most
suitable distribution for the data (Castilla (2007)). In Table C.3, we report the result
of heteroskedasticity consistent generalized estimation equations (GEE) with a logit link,
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binomial family, and an exchangeable correlation structure. These results are consistent with
those in our main models, indicating that our results are robust to alternative specifications.
The number of successful outcomes for banks far outweighs the number of unsuccessful
outcomes. So, a negative outcome for banks is a seemingly rare event in our data. But logistic
regression may underestimate the probability of rare events (King & Zeng (2001)). To correct
this potential bias, we re-estimated our models using rare event logistic regressions (King
& Zeng (2001)). We report the results of the rare event logistic regression in Table C.4.
All our hypothesized results are supported in this table and consistent with the logistic
regression result with negligible difference in the estimates (coefficient, standard errors
and significance level). The consistency and negligible bias correction factor between both
models are supported by the fact that the number of rare events (155) is substantially higher
relative to the total number cases (2013)1.
Testing for endogeneity. Further, although we have controlled for numerous variables
correlated with status and may influence the verdict, we may have omitted some other
variables that may make status endogenous. To rule out endogeneity concerns in our status
variable, we examined the main effect of status using an instrumental variable probit
model (ivpbrobit in Stata 15). Since status was coded based on banks’ network through the
preferred banker lists of corporations, we expected that banks that invest more in corporate
securities may be picked as preferred bankers more often than those of their peers that
invest less in corporate securities. Hence, we used the natural log of share investments in
a bank’s asset portfolio as an instrument for status. We report these results in Table C.5.
Bank status is highly significant in this model (=- 1.134, SE=0.227, p<0.001), providing
robustness to our findings about the impact of status on lawsuit outcomes. The Wald Chi-
Square test of exogeneity is highly insignificant (p=0.8674) in this model, suggesting that
status is unlikely to be endogenous.
3.7 Discussion
By re-examining the critical assumption of a persistent status halo underlying the well
established Matthew Effect in a socialist setting, we built a more contextualized theory
of status that considers the roles of leveling pressures in a society on the behavioral
expectations it holds about high-status firms. The Matthew Effect holds that status is self-
perpetuating due to the halo high-status actors enjoy in the society. Our results demonstrate
that, in a socialist setting, a high status can be a liability for a corporation, especially when it
is being evaluated on its integrity. However, what comes to the rescue of a high-status firm
1King & Zeng (2001) noted that the effect of their proposed rare event logistic regression in correcting for
the bias will be substantial when the total number of events is less than a few thousands with rare events
accounting for less than 5%. Our rare events account for more than 5% of the outcomes (i.e. 7.7%) hence the
negligible correction observed.
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is its accumulated good karma – i.e., the evidence of its social responsibility that deviates
from the expectations held by its skeptical audience.
The High Court in the Indian state of Kerala, which has a long history of socialism,
was significantly biased against high-status banks when evaluating cases between them
and their defaulting borrowers. But they ruled in favor of banks that were known for
socially responsible behavior. Our finding is contrary to that observed in prior research on
status-based biases in US courtrooms, which show that high-status firms benefit from the
status halo in the courtroom (Nielsen et al. (2010); McDonnell & King (2018)). Our study
makes important contributions to status theory and research on corporate misconduct.
Below, we discuss each.
Our first contribution is to status theory, which has predominantly been developed
within the confines of capitalist settings. It is widely understood that status is a desirable
asset for firms in a free-market economy that promotes corporate aspirations and rewards
high achieving firms. Lay evaluators are in awe of high-status firms, consumers, and
suppliers vie to do business with them, and their competitors want to be them or be with
them. An important by-product of this feature of status-based evaluations in a capitalist
economy is a status halo, where the audience holds high expectations from high-status
firms even in situations where it should not matter – such as in the courtrooms. This is
especially so when there is ambiguity in assessing claims, like in lawsuits. So high-status
firms get away with deviant behavior by riding on the halos their audience hold of them
(Phillips & Zuckerman (2001)). High-status firms even transport their halo into courts to
deal with objections raised by their weak stakeholders such as employees and customers
(McDonnell & King (2018)).
But prior research on status-based advantages takes the halo as the baseline expectation
and any deviation to it as an aberration based on overwhelming evidence that points to
the contrary (Adut (2005); Hahl & Zuckerman (2014); McDonnell & King (2018)). They
assume that the audience invariably holds high-status firms in high regard in every aspect
of evaluation. We contribute to this body of research by showing that the assumption about
the halo enjoyed by high-status firms is not universal. In a socialist economy, such as in
Kerala, high-status firms are subject to severe leveling pressures, as the audience is skeptical
about the means firms use to pursue their aspirations. So, the baseline expectation that
the audience holds about firms is stacked against high-status firms unless they present
overwhelming evidence that points to the contrary. The burden of proof in a socialist setting
is on the high-status firm and not its audience. A high-status firm must prove its innocence
through its actions as its audience tend to infer otherwise from its position in the social
hierarchy.
While we have demonstrated that socialist courtroom holds a negative baseline evalua-
tion about high-status firms, future research could examine if the biases against highstatus
firms extend to settings that are not typically socialist in nature. Recent experimental
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evidence suggests that even in capitalist settings, the audience may privately express their
suspicion about high-status actors while publicly celebrating them. The audience may deni-
grate their heroes in public only when there is overwhelming and widely known evidence
of their guilt (Hahl & Zuckerman (2014)). In socialist settings, however, the audience tends
to publicly express their suspicion of high-status actors and consider them culpable even
when there isn’t ample evidence of their guilt. In our study, courtroom judgments were
swayed by the public opinion generated by the party in power. Specifically, we find that
high-status firms’ negative evaluation in Kerala strengthened when a left-leaning party
was in control. The west is no stranger to left-leaning parties rising to power riding on
public opinion favoring social ends, such as environmental protection, progressive taxation,
and public goods provision. For instance, in US politics, while the Democratic party is
not a socialist party, there are socialist wings within it that blame corporate greed for a
variety of the social ills in the US (Gautney (2018)). Hence, even in a capitalist setting,
when a relatively left-leaning party comes to power, privately held suspicions of high-status
morality are more likely to be expressed publicly. Should this left-wing become more
prominent, as some political commentators expect (Howard (2019)), US courtrooms may
witness more discrimination cases that are ruled against the high-status firms. Considering
that courtroom biases have their origins in beliefs widely held in society (Edelman et al.
(2011)), future research could examine whether left-leaning parties coming to power in
capitalist settings might result in penalties for high-status firms in courtrooms akin to what
we observed in a socialist setting.
Relatedly, our study also contributes to research on corporate misconduct by theorizing
how firms may adapt their behavior to deal with society’s subjective interpretation of
deviance stacked against them. Prior research on organizational misconduct shows that
high-status organizations have an edge in pursuing deviant means to achieve their aspi-
rations because they are scrutinized less and enjoy the benefit of the doubt (Phillips &
Zuckerman (2001); Jensen (2006); Jonsson et al. (2009); McDonnell & King (2018) ). Al-
though high-status firms found guilty of deviance in the market society often get away with
it by issuing carefully crafted disclaimers (Phillips & Zuckerman (2001)), the audience does
punish them severely when they demonstrably fail to meet the high integrity expectations
held by their audience (Jensen (2006); Jonsson et al. (2009); McDonnell & King (2018)). It
goes to show that the audience can revise their expectations in the light of new evidence. We
contribute to this discussion by considering a setting where high-status firms are deemed
guilty by position.
In our study, high-status firms were able to revise the negative bias held by their au-
dience about them by acting in a manner that disconfirms those expectations. By lending
to sections of the society deemed as priority sectors by the state, commercial banks in
India could convince the Kerala High court of their innocence. So, whereas a high-status
firm engaging in deviant behavior must hope that it does not get caught or that its au-
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dience accepts its disclaimer under free-market capitalism, an innocent high-status firm
in a socialist setting must expect that its audience sees past its status and evaluate it on
the merit of its good deeds. Taken together, our study calls for a reconsideration of the
assumptions underlying status research. Even though the audience may accept high-status
actors’ position, they may not associate it with high integrity when there is widespread
suspicion about the means high-status actors use to ascend to their position and maintain
it.
Similarly, we expect that status can be a liability even in the fringes of the capitalist
economy routinely subject to leveling pressures. For instance, the informal market of the
urban ghettoes and ethnic enclaves in the US are subject to significant leveling pressures
that suppress status aspirations. Producers gravitate towards these informal markets as
a reaction to their alienation from mainstream markets, which is stacked against these
low-status producers, who are even considered non-players in the mainstream markets
by organizational theorists (Phillips & Zuckerman (2001)). One consequence of this is
that producers in these informal markets display a collective egalitarian consciousness
towards each other and consciously suppress their aspirations (Portes & Sensenbrenner
(1993)). Social capital for them does not stem from their position in the social hierarchy,
but from the solidarity and enforceable trust that they enjoy as a collective (Portes &
Sensenbrenner (1993); Venkatesh (2006)). Even though some players do come to occupy
socially advantageous positions in these markets (Sanders & Nee (1987)), such status-based
advantages are merely fleeting in these markets (Venkatesh (2006)), as status aspirations are
curbed by ‘leveling pressures’ in the informal economy (Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993)).
Our study illuminates that one of these leveling pressures maybe the audience’s biases
against high-status players while evaluating their integrity claims.
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Appendix A
Exchange Rate of West African Currencies relative to USD
Currency Stationarity Final Model Period Forecast Level: Volatility
Transition MC Oscillatory (2.33%) Stable
Nigeria MMSE Oscillatory (2.86%)
(Naira) Differenced I(1) ARIMA(0,1,[1,3])GARCH(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory (0.75%) Stable
MMSE Oscillatory (0.04%)
Transition MMSE Oscillatory (3.25%) Stable
Differenced I(1) ARIMA(0,1,[1,3])EGARCH(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory (0.37%) Stable
MMSE Oscillatory (0.39%)
Cape Transition MC Appreciation (2.88%) Stable
Verde MMSE Appreciation (2.94%)
(Escudo) Differenced I(1) ARIMA(0,1,1)GARCH(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory (2.01%) Stable
MMSE Oscillatory (0.08%)
Mauritania Transition MC Appreciation (2.62%) Stable
(Ouguiya) MMSE Appreciation (2.53%)
Differenced I(1) ARIMA(0,1,1)GARCH(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory (2.99%) Stable
MMSE Appreciation (5.28%)
CEFA Transition MC Oscillatory (1.56%) Stable
(XOF) MMSE Oscillatory (1.57%)












Detrended Transition MC Downward Trend Stable
(breakpoints) MMSE Downward Trend
(7/19/2002) ARIMA([1:6],0,0)EGARCH(1,1)
(8/6/2003) Post MC Downward Trend Stable
(12/14/2006) MMSE Downward Trend
Transition MC Depreciation (12.96%) 1-time
MMSE Depreciation (12.33%) Spike
Differenced I(1) ARIMA(0,1,[3,8,10]) Post MC Appreciation (0.33%) Stable
Guinea MMSE Appreciation (0.03%)
(Franc) Detrended Transition MC Oscillatory Stable
(breakpoints) MMSE Oscillatory
(7/15/2004) ARIMA([1,3,9],0,0)
(5/31/2005)) Post MC Downward Trend Stable
(4/20/2007) MMSE Downward Trend
Table A.1: Result of USD vs West African currencies
This table summarizes the results obtained from the analyses of the West African currencies with
respect to the USD both in the transition and post-transition period. At 5% significance, there is
no evidence to support any significant changes in these West-African currencies.
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Other Redenominated Currencies vs USD
Currency Stationarity Final Model Period Forecast Level: Volatility
Deviation from Path
Turkey Transition MC Depreciation ( 6.52%) Stable
(Lira) MMSE Depreciation (8.33%)
Differenced (I(1)) ARIMA(0,1,1)GJR(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory(0.71%) Stable
MMSE Oscillatory( 1.93%)
Mozambique Transition MC Depreciation (4.15%) Stable
(Metical) MMSE Depreciation (3.32%)
Differenced (I(1)) ARIMA([1:4],1,0)EGARCH(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory (0.5%) Stable
MMSE Oscillatory(1.25%)
Zambia Transition MC Depreciation (3.4%) Stable
(Kwacha) MMSE Depreciation (2.68%)
Differenced (I(1)) ARIMA(1,1,1)GARCH(1,1) Post MC Oscillatory (1.48%) Stable
MMSE Oscillatory ( 1.1%)
Table A.2: Result of Other Redenominated Currencies and USD
This table summarizes the results obtained from the analyses of the other redenominated
currencies with respect to major trading currency (USD) both in the transition and post-full
redenomination period. At 5% significant level, there is no evidence to support significant
changes in theres currencies during adoption of their respective redenomination policies.
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MC Simulated Exchange Rate Forecast: Ghana Cedi relative to USD






Figure A.1: Level Movement: Cedi vs USD : Truncated (Jan-2007 to Dec-2007)
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MC Simulated Forex Forecast: Ghana Cedi relative to USD Exchange Rate






Figure A.2: Trend Movement: Cedi vs USD : Truncated (Jan-2007 to Dec-2007)
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Figure A.3: Diagram of ACF/PACF Plots.
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QQ Plot of Sample Data versus Standard Normal Kernel












Kernel Density Plot of Standardized Residuals
Standardized Residuals
Standard Normal
Figure A.4: Diagram of QQ and Normality Plots
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Appendix B
SAMPLE OF DESIGNED EXPERIMENT ATTACHED BELOW
72
Consent for Participation in Social & Behavioral 
Research 
 
I consent to participating in research entitled: Social and Behavioral 
Research. 
 
Farouk Abdul-Salam (Principal Investigator) has explained the purpose of 
the study, the procedures to be followed, and the expected duration of 
my participation. Possible benefits of the study have been described, as 
have alternative procedures, if such procedures are applicable and 
available. 
 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional 
information regarding the study and that any questions I have raised 
have been answered to my full satisfaction. Furthermore, I understand 
that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue 
participation in the study without prejudice to me. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions and to obtain answers to my questions. 
 
I can contact the investigator. If I have any concerns about my rights as a 
research participant and/or my experiences while participating in this 
study, I may contact Director, Office of Research Ethics at Simon Fraser 
University. 
 
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent 
form. I signed it freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given to me. 
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Important: Explaining the Game
1. Relationship between Goods and Points
In this game there are two or more goods (i.e. Good A and Good B etc) that earn you points if you purchase them
Each good is associated with a diminishing marginal value/number of points.
This means that the more you buy a particular good, the less value/points you will get for each additional purchase.
Example
With reference to the table below, if you buy Good A, the FIRST unit generates 100 points.
If you decide to buy a SECOND Good A, you get will an additional 90 points. Your total points will be 190 points
HOWEVER, if you decide to buy Good B on your SECOND purchase, you will receive 100 points since  
that will be your first Good B purchase.Your Total Points will then be 200 points instead of 190 points 
2. Relationship between Goods and Currencies
In this game there are two or more currencies (i.e. Currency A$ and Currency B$ etc).
You will need Currency A to buy Good A, Currency B to buy Good B , Currency C to buy Good C etc.
Your initial ENDOWMENT of MONEY will be in Currency A$
You will have to CONVERT your Currency A$ Money to B$ in stage 1 in order to purchase Good B.
Finally, you will be shown the NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE which shows how many units of Currency B$ can be  
purchased with one unit of Currency A$
Example
Nominal Rate of A$1=B$10 means 1 A$-Currency will give you 10 B$-Currency 
and by converting A$3 you will receive B$30
Nominal Rate of A$1=C$2 means 1 A$-Currency will give you 2 C$-Currency  
and by converting A$5 you will receive C$10
Table of Points and Price in Country A and B
Point per Country Goods A in Country A ONLY Goods B in Country B ONLY
1st Purchase Point 100 100
2nd Purchase Point 90 90
3rd Purchase Point 75 75
Prices per Good A$1 B$1
EXAMPLE 2: Helping You Understand.













1 Good A & 1
Good B
100 points 100 points 100 + 100 = 200 points A$1 B$1
3 Good A & 2
Good B
100 + 90 +75 = 265
points
100 + 90 = 190
points




Farouk Abdul-Salam, let's test your understanding of the game.
What will be your points if you purchase one (1) Good A and two (2) Good B? :




Information on the Stages, Rounds & Payment
Stages in the Game
Below are the stages in this game. The stages outlined below will be repeated throughout this game.
1. Stage 1
Conversion/Exchange: In this stage, you have an endowment of money in the A$ Currency
You will need to convert to Currency B$ if you want to buy Good B, Currency C$ if you want to purchase Good C etc.
NOTE: All currencies will then be automatically spent on the available goods.  
(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g you can buy 1.5 of a Good etc)).
Currency B$ will be used to purchase Good B; Currency C$ will be used to purchase Good C.
2. Stage 2
Points Earned: Points you earned based on your purchase in stage 1 will be displayed 
after every round.
You will be REWARDED based on the TOTAL POINTS you earn.
CALCULATORS/CONVERTERS: OPTIONAL Points and Currency Calculators will be provided to you.
Rounds in the Game
You will play four rounds (4) of this game. The games may differ in terms of information and the number of currencies/goods. 
After you complete the four rounds, you will be asked to fill in a brief questionnaire.
MAXIMUM TIME FOR EACH ROUND IS 15 MINUTES
Payment
1. Points Earned
Points Earned: The points you earn on every stage will be recorded. 
At the end of the game, one of the rounds will be chosen. 




Welcome to Round 1 Farouk Abdul-Salam!!!
Information
1. Stage 1
Conversion/Exchange: In this stage, you have an endowment of money in Currency A$
There are 2 Goods available to purchase (Good A and Good B). 
You may purchase Good A and/or Good B.
NOTE:You can only purchase the Good B with Currency B$. 
(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g. 1.5 of a Good etc))
2. Stage 2
Points Earned: Points you earned based on your purchase will be displayed on the NEXT PAGE.
CALCULATORS/CONVERTERS: OPTIONAL Points and Currency Calculators will be provided to you.
Farouk Abdul-Salam, the maximum Time for this ROUND is 15 MINUTES
Choose a toss
Farouk Abdul-Salam, please pick the tosses of your choice below before moving to the next page.
First Toss















Please use the information provided to make your decision on how much of your A$-Currency  
you want to CONVERT into the B$-Currency .
Information:
1. Nominal Exchange Rate
A$1=B$15.
This means (ONE) A$ Currency will give you 15 B$ Currency




Good A Good B
Price Per Good A$10 or B$150 A$8.5 or B$127.5
This means that Good B is CHEAPER than Good A
Table of Diminishing Points in Countries A and B
Point per Country Goods A Good B
1st Purchase 380.0 380.0
2nd Purchase 282.0 282.0
3rd Purchase 254.0 254.0
4th Purchase 237.0 237.0
5th Purchase 225.0 225.0
6th Purchase 216.0 216.0
7th Purchase 209.0 209.0
NOTE:(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g you can buy 1.5 of a Good etc)) and  
the more you buy from one particular country, the less additional/marginal points you receive
Calculator
Goods to Points Converter
You can Enter the Quantity of Good of A or B to See the Points Equivalent.
Good A:  Points:  
Good B:  Points: 
Currency Converter
You can Enter the Currency A$ to see its Currency B$ Equivalent
CurrencyA$:  CurrencyB$: 
How much do you want to convert from your A$-Currency Endowment/Money to buy Good B?.
Time left to complete this page: 14:54
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The remainder of A$ after your conversion will be used to purchase Good A





Endowment/Money Portfolio You Formed
A$ Endowment/Money B$ Endowment/Money
A$47.0 B$345.0
Price of Good A=A$10 or B$150 Price of Good B= A$8.5 or B$127.5
Your Country A Earnings
Your A$47.0 Money was able to buy 4.7 Good A
Hence the points you earned from the Country A is 1310.58 points .
Your Country B Earnings
Your B$345.0 Money was able to buy 2.71 Good B
Hence points you earned from the Country B is 842.62 points .
Your Total Points Earnings




Welcome to Round 2 Farouk Abdul-Salam !!!
Information
1. Stage 1
Conversion/Exchange: In this stage, you have an endowment of money in the A$ Currency
There are 2 Goods available to purchase. You may purchase Good A and/or Good B
However, the Price for Good B can increase or decrease with 50% chance.
NOTE: You can only purchase the Good B with Currency B$. 
(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g 1.5 of Good))
2. Stage 2
Points Earned: Points you earned based on your conversion will be displayed AFTER ROUND 4.
CALCULATORS/CONVERTERS: OPTIONAL Points and Currency Calculators will be provided to you.





Please use the information provided to make your decision on how much of your A$-Currency  
you want to CONVERT into any of the Currencies below.
Information:
1. Nominal Exchange Rate
Currency B
Nominal Exchange Rate A$1=B$20
This means 1A$ will give you 20B$.
2. Your Original Endowment
You have A$40
3. Price of Good A
The Price of Good A is A$5.5 or (B$110 in Currency-B$)
4. Price Distribution Information for Goods B
Price Distribution Information
Probability/Chance Good B Price
50% Chance of Good B Decrease A$4.95 or B$99
50% Chance of Good B Increase A$6.05 or B$121
This means that the Price of Good B can increase to A$6.05(i.e Expensive Good B) or deccrease to A$4.95(i.e. Cheap Good B)
with 50% Chance
Table of Diminishing Points Countries A and B
Point per Country Goods A Good B
1st Purchase 400.0 400.0
2nd Purchase 296.0 296.0
3rd Purchase 267.0 267.0
4th Purchase 249.0 249.0
5th Purchase 237.0 237.0
6th Purchase 228.0 228.0
7th Purchase 220.0 220.0
NOTE:(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g you can buy 1.5 of a Good etc)) and  
the more you buy from one particular country, the less additional/marginal points you receive
Calculator
Goods to Points Converter
You can Enter the Quantity of Good of A or B to See the Points Equivalent.
Good A:  Points:  
Good B:  Points: 




You can Enter the Currency A$ to see its Currency B$
CurrencyA$:  CurrencyB$: 
How much do you want to convert from your A$-Currency Endowment/Money?




Welcome to Round 3 Farouk Abdul-Salam!!!
Information
1. Stage 1
Conversion/Exchange: In this stage, you have an endowment of money in the A$ Currency
There are 2 Goods available to purchase. You may purchase Good A and/or Good B
However, the Nominal Exchange Rate ( i.e. Amount of your Currency B$) can increase or decrease with 50% chance.
(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g. 1.5 of Good etc))
2. Stage 2
Points Earned: Points you earned based on your purchase in stage 1 will be displayed on the NEXT PAGE .
CALCULATORS/CONVERTERS: OPTIONAL Points and Currency Calculators will be provided to you.





Please use the information provided to make your decision on how much of your A$-Currency you want  
to CONVERT into the B-Currency.
Information:
1. Your Original Endowment
You have A$35
2. Nominal Exchange Rate
Original Rate: A$1=B$10.
This means 1 A$ Currency will give you 10 B$ Currency
3. Nominal Exchange Rate Uncertainty/Risk Information
Probability/Chance Nominal Exchange Rate
50% Chance of Decrease A$1 = B$9
50% Chance of Increase A$1 = B$11
This means the amount you CONVERT to Currency B$ can INCREASE or DECREASE before the next Points Stage
4. Price Information
Price Information
Good A Good B
Price Per Good A$5 or B$50 A$4.25 or B$42.5
This means that Good B are CHEAPER than Good A
Table of Diminishing Points in Countries A and B
Point per Country Goods A Good B
1st Purchase 420.0 420.0
2nd Purchase 311.0 311.0
3rd Purchase 280.0 280.0
4th Purchase 262.0 262.0
5th Purchase 249.0 249.0
6th Purchase 239.0 239.0
7th Purchase 231.0 231.0
8th Purchase 225.0 225.0
9th Purchase 219.0 219.0
NOTE:(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g you can buy 1.5 of a Good etc)) and  
the more you buy from one particular country, the less additional/marginal points you receive
Calculator
Goods to Points Converter
You can Enter the Quantity of Good of A or B to See the Points Equivalent.
Time left to complete this page: 14:57
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Good A:  Points:  
Good B:  Points: 
Currency Converter
You can Enter the Currency A$ to see its Currency B$ Equivalent
CurrencyA$:  CurrencyB$: 
How much do you want to convert from your A$-Currency Endowment?
(NOTE: You have A$35 Endowment/Money; 





Endowment/Money Portfolio You Formed
The realized state is LOW/DEPRECIATION (i.e 1A$ = 9B$). This means Currency B$'s value has changed and below are the results
A$ Endowment/Money B$ Endowment/Money
A$25.0 B$90.0
Price of Good A=A$5 or B$50 Price of Good B=A$4.25 or B$42.5
Your Country A Earnings
Your A$25.0 Money was able to buy 5.0 Good A
Hence the points you earned from Country A is 1522.04 points .
Your Country B Earnings
Your B$90.0 Money was able to buy 2.12 Good B
Hence points you earned from the Country B is 765.48 points .
Your Total Points Earnings





Please use the information provided to make your decision on how much of your A-Currency  
you want to CONVERT to B-Currency.
Information:
1. Nominal Exchange Rate
A$1=B$350
This means 1A$ will give you 350B$




Good A Good B
Prices per Good 10.5A$ or B$3675.0 A$8.4 or B$2940.0
This means Good B is CHEAPER than Good A
Table of Diminishing Points in Countries A and B
Point per Country Good A Good B
1st Purchase 480.0 480.0
2nd Purchase 356.0 356.0
3rd Purchase 320.0 320.0
4th Purchase 299.0 299.0
5th Purchase 284.0 284.0
6th Purchase 273.0 273.0
7th Purchase 264.0 264.0
NOTE:(Fractions/Decimals are allowed (e.g you can buy 1.5 of a Good etc)) and  
the more you buy from one particular country, the less additional/marginal points you receive
Calculator
Goods to Points Converter
You can Enter the Quantity of Good of A or B to See the Points Equivalent.
Good A:  Points:  
Good B:  Points: 
Currency Converter
You can Enter the Currency A$ to see its Currency B$ Equivalent
CurrencyA$:  CurrencyB$: 
How much do you want to convert from your A$-Currency Endowment/Money?
Time left to complete this page: 14:51
88
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Endowment/Money Portfolio You Formed
A$ Endowment/Money B$ Endowment/Money
A$57.0 B$8050.0
Price of Good A=A$10.5 or B$3675.0 Price of Good B=A$8.4 or B$2940.0
Your Country A Earnings
Your A$57.0 Money was able to buy 5.43 Good A
Hence the points you earned from Country A is 1857.76 points .
Your Country B Earnings
Your B$8050.0 Money was able to buy 2.74 Good B
Hence points you earned from Country B is 1074.48 points .
Your Total Points Earnings





Endowment/Money Portfolio You Formed
The realized price is Low Good B Price (i.e A$4.95 or B$99.0). Below are the results
A$ Endowment/Money B$ Endowment/Money
A$8.0 B$640.0
Price of Good A=A$5.5 or B$110.0 Price of Good B=A$4.95 or B$99.0
Your Country A Earnings
Your A$8.0 Money was able to buy 1.45 Good A
Hence the points you earned from Country A is 539.81 points .
Your Country B Earnings
Your B$640.0 Money was able to buy 6.46 Good B
Hence points you earned from Country B is 1780.31 points .
Your Total Points Earnings





Please answer the following questions.
How many countries have you visited apart from your country of residence?




















If Other, indicate in the box below:
Which Country or Countries have you spent much of your life in ?
Kindly leave a COMMENT on what you think influenced your decision on the money conversion.





Thank You Very Much Farouk Abdul-Salam!!!
This is the END of the game.
Round 3 was chosen randomly as your Payment Round
Your total points there was 2287.51-POINTS
You will receive a GIFT CARD or an ECONOMICS BOOK if your points is one of the highest.
I truly appreciate your time and effort.
Next
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix
ID Covariates Mean SD. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Favored Outcome 0.92 0.27
2 Size 21.16 33.14 0.04
3 Performance 0.01 0.0 -0.09 0.14
4 Asset Quality 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.39 0.02
5 Listings 0.92 0.27 0.03 0.18 0.42 0.25
6 Legal Exp. 13.20 26.35 0.04 0.94 0.10 0.39 0.14
7 Advertisement Exp. 31.87 55.23 0.06 0.90 0.12 0.40 0.16 0.89
8 State-Owned 0.65 0.48 0.05 0.30 0.01 0.24 0.41 0.21 0.21
9 Win Rate 0.86 0.20 0.21 0.08 -.10 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10
10 Case Cited 0.12 0.88 -0.13 -.02 -.01 0.01 -.08 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.03
11 Acts Cited 0.75 1.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 0.38
12 Communist 0.36 0.48 -0.18 -0.22 0.41 -0.20 -0.15 -0.21 -0.28 -0.24 -0.26 0.07 0.08
13 Social Lending 0.31 0.09 -0.01 -0.12 0.43 0.28 0.61 -0.13 -0.19 0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.21
14 Status 1.13 1.08 -0.03 -0.13 0.21 -0.12 0.29 -0.17 -0.13 0.28 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.40
N = 2013
Table C.2: Distribution of Cases in Different Political Regimes
Political Regime Year Losses Wins Total
2006 0 5 5
2007 8 37 45
LDF 2008 21 110 131
2009 21 121 142
2010 52 348 400
2011 24 305 329
2012 8 312 320
UDF 2013 10 257 267
2014 9 314 323
2015 2 49 51
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Table C.3: GEE Estimates for Outcome of Debt Recovery Lawsuits Favoring Banks
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Bank Size -0.02* -0.01* -0.01 -0.02** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Bank Performance -106.53*** -84.99** -76.91** -107.74*** -85.67***
(27.82) (27.68) (27.30) (20.67) (23.96)
Bank’s Asset Quality -25.38** -24.68** -23.14* -28.23** -22.94*
(9.78) (9.53) (9.65) (9.06) (9.21)
Listed Banks -0.63 -0.27 -0.22 -0.31 -0.05
(0.75) (0.51) (0.55) (0.44) (0.32)
Bank’s Legal Expenses 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank’s Advertisement Expenses 0.02** 0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State-Owned Banks 0.42*** 0.28 0.45** 0.37** 0.41***
(0.10) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.09)
Bank’s Win Rate 1.96*** 1.89*** 1.95*** 1.83*** 1.86***
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
Number of Case Cited -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of Acts Cited 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Communist in Power -0.95*** -0.83*** -0.38 -0.96*** -0.35
(0.27) (0.21) (0.31) (0.23) (0.29)
Socially Responsible Lending 6.47*** 5.23*** 4.65** 5.57*** 3.56**
(1.48) (1.52) (1.50) (1.21) (1.17)
Bank Status -0.21* -0.00 -1.51*** -1.50***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.35) (0.38)
Bank Status -0.37* -0.47***
X Communist in Power (0.16) (0.14)
Bank Status 4.16*** 4.91***
X Socially Responsible Lending (1.11) (1.22)
Constant 1.13* 1.20** 0.87* 1.34** 1.03*
(0.46) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42)
Chi Square 1234.659 281.348 601.810 1662.669 2672.879
N = 2013 lawsuits involving 58 commercial banks.
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
Observations clustered by bank to account for non-independence
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Table C.4: Rare Event Logit Estimates for Outcome of Debt Recovery Lawsuits Favoring
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Bank Size -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Bank Performance -76.47* -80.74** -69.29* -85.32*** -74.04**
(30.64) (27.46) (27.57) (24.18) (25.04)
Bank’s Asset Quality -18.49* -23.31* -20.51* -23.52* -20.15*
(9.22) (9.46) (9.56) (9.36) (9.55)
Listed Banks -0.26 -0.22 -0.08 -0.08 0.12
(0.45) (0.51) (0.49) (0.37) (0.31)
Bank’s Legal Expenses -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank’s Advertisement Expenses 0.02** 0.02** 0.01* 0.02* 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State-Owned Banks 0.12 0.30 0.41* 0.22 0.33*
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Bank’s Win Rate 1.89*** 1.88*** 1.92*** 1.83*** 1.86***
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Number of Case Cited -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.27***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Number of Acts Cited 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Communist in Power -0.87*** -0.82*** -0.39 -0.88*** -0.36
(0.26) (0.21) (0.31) (0.22) (0.30)
Socially Responsible Lending 4.05** 4.95** 3.99** 4.33** 2.92*
(1.41) (1.51) (1.47) (1.34) (1.32)
Bank Status -0.21* -0.04 -1.04* -1.24**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.40) (0.42)
Bank Status -0.33* -0.42**
X Communist in Power (0.15) (0.13)
Bank Status 2.60* 3.92**
X Socially Responsible Lending (1.17) (1.31)
Constant 1.20** 1.15** 0.86* 1.28** 0.99*
(0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
N = 2013 lawsuits involving 58 commercial banks.
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
Observations clustered by bank to account for non-independence
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)
96











Bank’s Legal Expenses -0.00
(0.00)




Bank’s Win Rate -0.10
(1.41)
Number of Case Cited -0.06
(0.19)
Number of Acts Cited 0.06
(0.07)
Communist in Power -0.06
(0.42)








N = 2013 lawsuits involving 58 commercial banks.
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
Observations clustered by bank to account for non-independence
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed tests)




Figure 1: Moderating Effect of Communist Party in Power 
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